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Introduction
Law is impersonal. The state generally does not tailor the contents of the law to
people’s characteristics and traits. In this Article we argue that in the era of Big Data, law
should become more personalized. Our main focuses are default rules (situations where
people face a choice between sticking with a default option or specifying a different
option instead) and disclosure (where the law mandates that individuals receive particular
information). Our claim has important applications to contract law, consumer law,
inheritance law, medical malpractice, property law, labor law, privacy law, and other
fields.
Let us illustrate our approach with an example from inheritance law. Empirical
research has shown that married fathers are more likely than married mothers to bequeath
all their property to their spouse (55 percent compared to 34 percent).1 Moreover,
according to those studies men bequeath significantly larger shares of their estates to their
spouses (80 percent of estates are willed to widows versus 40 percent to widowers). This
data is consistent with rational choice models of behavior: Wives trust their husbands less
than husbands trust their wives to use inherited resources in the best interests of their
mutual children, since men are significantly more likely to remarry and devote resources
to the children from their second marriage, at the expense of children from their first
marriage.2
If men’s testamentary preferences differ systematically from women’s, why
should intestacy laws continue to be gender-neutral?3 Why not have different default
intestacy rules for men and women instead? We argue that as long as these preferences
remain stable and gender-correlated, a different set of rules for women would lead in the
long run to more estate resources being allocated to heirs according to decedents’ true
preferences. We further posit that it may be desirable to use other readily observable
characteristics (e.g., wealth, health, time of marriage, age of children, and occupation)
that could predict default rules in intestacy for population subgroups. As with any default
rules, individuals would be free to alter these defaults by executing a will.
We also advocate a more ambitious version of personalization here, one that
would let courts determine how an intestate’s estate should be allocated based on analysis
of his consumer behavior during his lifetime. In an era of Big Data, we suggest that it will
1

Debra S. Judge & Sarah Blaffer Hardy, Allocation of Accumulated Resources Among Kin: Inheritance in
Sacramento, California, 1890–1984, 13 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 495 (1992); Daphna Hacker, The
Gendered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical Food for Legal Thought, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
322, 334 (2010).
2

Debra S. Judge, American Legacies and the Variable Life Histories of Women and Men, 6 HUMAN
NATURE 291 (1995).
3

We will simplify the analysis by assuming that the decisions of people of a particular gender who have
wills and people of the same gender who die intestate have similar preferences – but this is an assumption
that ought to be tested empirically. See generally Hacker, supra note 1, at 329 (noting that intestates die at a
younger age than testators on average); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in
Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1073 (2004) (noting that intestates are poorer than
individuals who die with a will, and that this factor may engender selection effects).
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be possible to find individuals whose observable behavior and characteristics closely
match those of the intestate – we refer to these people as “guinea pigs” – to examine the
kinds of choices that the guinea pigs made in their wills, and then to use these choices as
a template for determining what the intestate likely would have wanted.4 An upshot of
widely employing this approach is that more estates would be allocated in a way that
better approximates the true preferences of the decedent. Given the fact that most
individuals leave no wills, that could be a significant advantage. Furthermore, with
detailed intestate defaults, many individuals who would have otherwise needed to incur
the expenses of drafting wills now may no longer need to do so. After all they will
recognize that even in the absence of a written will their intestacy rules will be
personalized, more closely approximating what they would have wanted than the status
quo’s one-size-fits-all approach.
We are not the first to raise the possibility of using personalized default rules.
Recently, Cass Sunstein offered a provocative assessment of existing, impersonal default
rules and two alternatives to them: active choices and personalized default rules.5
Sunstein’s work continues a conversation begun by Ian Ayres, who first argued that
default rules could be “tailored” to market conditions or the attributes of parties,6 and
continued by George Geis, who modeled tailored and untailored default rules under
particular sets of assumptions to analyze the welfare implications of trading off precision
against complexity.7
Sunstein’s bottom line is that “personalized default rules are the wave of the
future; we should expect to see a significant increase in personalization as greater
information becomes available about the informed choices of diverse people.”8 We agree
wholeheartedly, and regard his contribution to the literature as significant. He astutely
notes that the appeal of personalized default rules depends on the heterogeneity among a
given population, the state’s access to information about individuals’ preferences and
ability to create a structure conducive to rational choices, the richness of the data
available about individual preferences, and the transaction and confusion costs associated
with prompting parties to a transaction to make active choices about the parameters of a
deal.9 He inventively envisions personalized default rules in contexts like the choice of
4

For much more on guinea pigs, see infra Section II.C.

5

Cass R. Sunstein, Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default Rules: A
Triptych, Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper RPP-2012-17 (2012). Under a regime of active
choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options – the contract cannot be silent with respect
to a particular term.
6

Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L. J. 1, 4 & n.15 (1993); see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian v.
Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1593, 1596-1606 (1999) (identifying several types of
contracting party heterogeneity, and showing how they might affect the law’s choice among defaults
preferred by the majority or those preferred only by a minority of contracting parties).
7

George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 TULANE L. REV.
1109 (2006) (examining the trade-off between simple and complex default rules).
8

Sunstein, supra note 5, at 25.

9

Id. at 3-4.

3

retirement plans, cell phone plans, mortgages, and other settings.10 That said, Sunstein’s
discussion of personalized default rules is truncated – it is a short part of a short essay.
And the earlier work by Ayres and Geis explicitly lumps together default rules that are
tailored based on both contracting parties’ characteristics and market conditions, focusing
– in the abstract – on the costs of promulgating and adjudicating tailored default rules.11
No scholars have previously offered a comprehensive theory of personalized
default rules, nor has anyone explored the feasibility of such an approach in detail. In this
Article we will develop such a theory, show its feasibility in the real world, and point out
what legislatures and courts should do in order to make a personalized default rule regime
implementable in many fields. In particular, we will show that with a bit of innovative
tweaking, tools developed in the age of Big Data can facilitate the creation of certainty
surrounding the meaning of default terms to heterogeneous individuals and firms. By
mitigating so much of the uncertainty associated with the development of personalized
default rules, Big Data can make personalization far more appealing than it was in
previous information environments.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the existing thinking on default
rules, identifying the dominant strategies for supplying default rules: majoritarian default
rules, and minoritarian (penalty) default rules. It then shows how each of these two types
of default rules might be improved via personalization, such that the contents of the rules
in question will differ among heterogeneous individuals. In this Part we illustrate our
claims mostly through consumer contracts and point out the main considerations which
could make personalized default rules approach a viable option.
Part II examines the feasibility of personalizing default rules. It observes that
crude default rules – which use one readily observable characteristic, such as gender or
age, to sort individuals into appropriate default rules – are already feasible, but they are
also imprecise and can be morally problematic. We show that granular default rules,
which sort individuals into several or many different default terms based on the
interactions of multiple factors, are becoming increasingly feasible in the era of Big Data.
Part II examines some of the potential gains from using both crude and granular default
rules, in inheritance law, consumer law, the law of medical malpractice, real property
law, and potentially even labor law. A key innovation in Part II is our proposed use of
“guinea pigs” to personalize defaults. Under such an approach a small portion of the
population is given a great deal of information and time to make decisions, and then the
remaining members of the population are assigned the default terms chosen by the guinea
pigs whose observed behavior and characteristics most closely match their own.
Part III considers a number of important objections to our proposal for
personalizing default rules. These serious objections include concerns about unfair crosssubsidies, strategic behavior by consumers, uncertainty and the fragmentation of case law
interpreting contractual language, using statistics and creating stereotypes, the
constitutional implications of a legal regime that provides different default rules to people
10

Id. at 24.

11

See Geis, supra note 7, at 1124-29 (discussing the expected costs of having tailored default rules); Ayres,
supra note 6 (analogizing the tailored vs. untailored default rule dilemma, with the rules vs. standards
debate).
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based on immutable characteristics, the privacy tradeoffs associated with the collection
and use of information about individuals, and the flexibility of personalized default rules
to deal with people whose personalities, values, and behavior change over time. In some
cases, these objections have significant force and caution against a full-throated embrace
of personalized default rules. In other instances, we show how personalized default rules
can be structured so as to mitigate potential downsides.
Part IV shows how the same arguments for personalized default rules also
buttress the case for personalized disclosure to consumers and citizens. Our present
regime uses distinctly twentieth-century technologies to disclose risks, side effects, and
tradeoffs to consumers and citizens. In the modern era, there is little reason to rely on
these antiquated, impersonal forms of disclosure. We instead propose a regime of
“personalized disclosure” whereby data about individual preferences, characteristics, and
predilections will be employed to improve the signal-to-noise ratio of disclosures
concerning products and services. Under such a regime pregnant women would be shown
prominent warnings likely to be of greatest interest to them, and septuagenarian men
would see only the warnings likely to be of greatest interest to those similarly situated.
This is how a family physician or a small-town pharmacist’s disclosure to a well-known
patient has long proceeded. But it is not the way that disclosure works for consumer
products or medical services generally. Our insight is that the powerful existing critiques
of disclosure remedies are not critiques of disclosure as such, but rather critiques of
impersonal disclosure. Personalized disclosure is becoming increasingly achievable in the
modern era, and we provide some initial thoughts on how it might be accomplished.
Indeed, we believe more broadly that personalized disclosures and personalized default
rules – and even personalized law in general – will become essential tools in legal
regulators’ quivers in the coming decades. We even posit that personalized disclosure can
ameliorate some of the complexity problems association with a shift toward personalized
default rules. The ills of personalization, it turns out, may be countered by even more
personalization.
I. Theories of Default Rules
Default rules regulate much of our lives. Any transaction in which consumers,
merchants, employees, employers, tenants or landlords engage will be governed by
default rules. Unsurprisingly, some commentators have suggested that one of the main
goals of contract law is to reduce transaction costs by providing contracting parties with
default rules, which apply to their transactions unless they explicitly or implicitly reject
them.12
12

See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 341 (6th ed. 2012) (“Default rules fill gaps
in contracts in order to reduce transaction costs”); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 302 notes. 13,14 (2004) (arguing that courts should complete gaps in contracts using
rules that are most likely to be desired by the parties in order to reduce writing costs); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 606 (1990) (“The
central task for the law of commercial contracts is to fill gaps in incomplete contracts.”); Alan Schwartz,
Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 271, 277 (1992) (arguing that default rules should minimize transaction costs and lower the
costs associated with incomplete contracts).

5

Default rules also regulate what happens after people die. When people die
intestate (without a will) default rules, prescribed by inheritance law, allocate the estate
among the heirs in a certain manner.13 An individual may opt out of the default intestacy
rules by leaving a will that allocates the estate differently among the heirs, but as long as
she does not do so, the default rules prevail. Since many people die intestate, the content
of the default rules is of the utmost importance. Here, the default rules are particularly
“sticky”14 because biases and cognitive constraints prevent people from contemplating
their future death and the transaction costs associated with creating a will can be high.
Under the most influential default rule theory, which we discuss in detail
below, default rules are aimed at decreasing transaction costs. In order for default rules
to achieve this goal, they generally should track most people’s preferences and desires. If
default rules do not satisfy this condition, they would increase, rather than decrease,
transaction costs since most parties would opt out, and opting out is costly. Furthermore,
sometimes the parties would not opt out of undesirable default rules, because opting out
is too costly, and they will be governed by rules they would have never chosen in the
absence of transaction costs. Finally, sometimes transaction costs prevent deals from
being struck where a meeting of the minds would have occurred in the absence of such
transaction costs; thus, reducing transaction costs by providing the parties with default
rules they prefer sometimes facilitates deals.
15

The legal literature has long recognized that default rules should be tailored to
specific types of transactions, until the point at which finer tailoring is not cost justified,
namely, when additional tailoring will increase rather than decrease transaction costs.16
A. Contract Law Default Rules in General
If contracting parties were required to agree upon all the terms of their contracts,
negotiation would be endless, drafting costs would skyrocket, many efficient contracts
currently executed would never result in meetings of the mind. Contract law thus
provides the parties with numerous default rules that become part of their contracts,
unless implicitly or explicitly rejected by the parties.17 For instance, under section 2-308
13

See Conn. Gen. Stat. §45a-437 (2012) (determining intestate succession in the state of Connecticut); Cal
Prob. Off. Div. 6, Pt. 2 (determining intestate succession in the state of California); 18-A M.R.S. § 2-101
(2012) (determining intestate succession in the state of Maine).

14

See Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLORIDA STATE L. REV. 651
(2006) (using the term "sticky" to define default rules in settings where the default rule is rarely changed,
due to high transaction costs or for other reasons such as fear of unknown contract provisions).
15

Infra Section A.1.

16

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 117-8 (1989) (arguing that adopting tailored rules to fill gaps in the contract,
creates costs of distinguishing different types of parties and transactions); Ayres, supra note 6 (arguing that
when decision maker creates a tailored default rule she should account for both precision and complexity).
17

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 12, at 293 (“When a court imputes terms to fill in a contract, the implicit
terms apply by default, which means ‘in the absence of explicit terms to the contrary’”); SHAVELL, supra
note 12, at 302 notes 13, 14 (arguing that when parties leave gaps in the contract courts should fill these
gaps by adopting an interpretation method that minimizes the sum of writing costs and the costs of errors in
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of the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), “[u]nless otherwise agreed… the place for
delivery of goods is the seller’s place of business or if none, the seller’s residence...” The
parties now do not need to agree beforehand on the place of delivery, since as long as
they do not say otherwise, delivery would take place at the seller’s place. And section 2314 of the U.C.C. maintains that “[u]nless excluded or modified… a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is
a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” The U.C.C. proceeds in clarifying in
details what merchantability means.18 As a result, parties to a sale contract need not
explicitly agree that the goods sold should be merchantable if the seller is a merchant;
they also do not need to define what merchantability means – the law does it for them.
Remedies for breach of contract can be understood as another important source
of default rules. While expectation damages are the default rule, the parties may agree
otherwise, for example, by excluding or limiting liability for consequential losses or by
incorporating a liquidated damages clause into their contracts.19 Indeed, the parties’
power to opt out of the “full compensation” default rule is limited: courts could strike
down a liquidated damages clause as a penalty20 or use the doctrine of unconscionability
to refuse to enforce exclusionary clauses in consumer contracts, especially when they
exonerate the merchant from liability for bodily injury.21
B. Majoritarian Default Rules
1. In General
Under the majoritarian default rules theory, which is the most accepted and
influential one among law and economics theorists, a default rule should mimic the term
that the majority of the contracting parties to whom it applies would have agreed upon, if
they had considered it as an option when making their contract.22 Thus, if most
the interpretation); Ayres and Gertner, supra note 16, at 87 (“Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete
contracts, and they govern unless the parties contract around them.”)
18

U.C.C., § 2-314(2) (detailing the conditions under which goods are considered merchantable). .

19

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) (stating that the parties can decide in advance the
damages payable in case of breach, and that such an agreement replaces the courts inquiry about the correct
level of damages); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §12.18 (4d ed. 2004) (stating that parties can
agree upon remedial rights, different than the remedies usually supplied by the courts).
20

FARNSWORTH, id., id. (stating that parties’ power to bargain over remedial rights is limited by the
principle of compensation, which means that the stipulated sum cannot be significantly larger than the
amount required to compensate the injured party for its loss) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
supra note 19, id. (stating that the parties’ power to set liquidated damages is limited, and that the
liquidated damages provision must regard the principle of compensation).
21

U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (“Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable.”).

22

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 12, at 293-4 (arguing that courts should impute terms in the contract that the
parties would have agreed upon if they had negotiated the term in advance); SHAVELL, supra note 12, at
302-3 note 14 (arguing that the welfare maximizing method of filling gaps in a contract tends to be an
accurate reflection of parties’ desires); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 1591-3 (arguing that in some
cases gaps should be filled by the majoritarian default, which is the rule that most parties would have
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contracting parties in a sales contract prefer delivery of the goods to take place at the
seller’s place, section 2-308 of the U.C.C. is the appropriate default rule. The logic
behind the majoritarian default rules theory is simple: since default rules aim at
decreasing transaction costs, they should fit the transactors’ preferences as closely as
possible. There would always be parties that prefer a rule different than the one preferred
by the majority, and they would have to opt out of the default rule, thereby incurring
transaction costs. But the majority of the transactors would not opt out, thereby saving the
transaction costs they would have incurred but for the default rule.23
A central question for the majoritarian theory is how to predict most parties’
preferences. Do most parties to sales contracts prefer delivery of the goods at the seller’s
or the buyer’s place? Do they prefer expectation damages or maybe just reliance
damages? Law and economics scholars contend that most contracting parties want their
contracts to reduce costs and increase benefits, thereby increasing the surplus of their
contract, which they can divide among themselves.24 Therefore, the majoritarian default
rule should be efficient. Thus, according to this view, if in most cases the costs of
delivery at the seller’s place of business are lower than at the buyer’s, section 2-308 of
the U.C.C. is an efficient default rule. Similarly, if full expectation damages provide more
efficient incentives to the parties to perform and reduce expected losses compared to
reliance damages, an expectation damages default rule is superior to a reliance damages
default rule.25 Note that one should not be efficiency-oriented to adopt the majoritarian
default rule theory; this theory is committed to one notion only: the default rule should
mimic the majority of the parties’ preferences, whatever these preferences are.26

wanted); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1820-3 (1991) (arguing that default rules should be the most likely result of a
hypothetical bargaining between the parties).
23

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 12, at 294 (arguing that the efficient default rule is preferable because most
parties would not wish to opt-out, and that will save transaction costs)
24

Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX L. REV. 1581,1588
(2005) (“Each party [to the contract] wants to maximize his gain from the transaction, and that is usually
done by agreeing to terms that maximize the surplus created by the transaction - the excess of benefits over
costs, the excess being divided between the parties”); Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer,
Remedies On and Off Contract, 120 YALE L. J. 690 (2011) (arguing that the remedy of rescission followed
by restitution is socially desirable, and that the parties to the contract would want it ex-ante, since it
incentivizes the parties to invest in the contract to the level that maximizes the joint surplus)
25

See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 THE BELL J. OF ECON. 466 (arguing
that full expectation damages provide efficient incentive to parties to perform, and thus fill gaps in the
contract that involve unlikely future contingencies); Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be
Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1573-4 (2009) (arguing that the
promisor’s option to breach and pay expectation damages is a default rule incorporated into an incomplete
contract); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 12, at 287-9 (arguing that expectation damages usually give better
incentives to the promisor, and therefore are superior to reliance damages).
26

See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV.
489 (1989) (explaining how non-efficiency theories of contract law could be the source of default rules, but
arguing that efficiency is much better source); Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default
Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396 (2009) (arguing that some default rules have distributive, rather than an
efficiency, effect, and proposing criteria for giving those default rules content).
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Default rules can be context-sensitive, which is a nod in the direction of
personalization.27 Thus, even if a damages default rule is better than a specific
performance default rule in total since most contracting parties would prefer the former
remedy to the latter, there could be enough situations, and enough types of contracts,
where most parties would have the opposite preference. While the more common remedy
under American contract law is damages,28 when the contract is for the sale of a unique
good, courts are commonly willing to grant a remedy of specific performance.29 Instead
of having one default rule as to the choice between damages and specific performance for
all contracts, there are two different default rules: one for selling unique goods, and
another for other contracts. But the default rules could be – and indeed they are – even
more specifically tailored, and at least from an economics point of view they should be
tailored until the point where additional tailoring is not cost justified.30 We discuss this
issue below in more detail.31
2. Personalized Majoritarian Default Rules
Tailoring default rules is often done for different types of transactions, or for
different contexts (even for the same type of transaction). But as far as we can tell, it is
not done for the personal characteristics of the parties.32 Consider the following example.
Example 1. Place of Delivery. Dan is a disabled consumer, who relies on a
wheelchair for mobility. He purchases a large-screen television from an
electronics store. Should the default place of delivery be the seller’s or the
buyer’s place?
27

See Ayres, supra note 6, at 4-6 (arguing that when decision maker creates a tailored default rule she
should find the optimal point in which the rule is specific enough but not too complex); Geis, supra note 7
(modeling the simplicity-complexity dimension of default rules, and suggesting that under certain
assumptions a simpler, though less accurate, default rule would better reduce transaction costs).

28

FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, at §12.8 (stating that the award of damages, measured by the injured
party's expectation, is the common form of relief for breach of contract).
29

Anthony Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 355-6 (1978) (stating that courts
typically grant specific performance in contracts for the sale of a “unique” item, such as the sale of land,
antiques, patent rights, etc.); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L. J. 271, 272-4
(1979) (same).
30

Ayres, supra note 6, at 7-9 (arguing that since more tailoring creates complexity and uncertainty, the
decision maker needs to tailor the rule up to the point where these costs outweigh the reduction in
transaction costs).
31

Infra Part III.C.

32

In the U.C.C there is a distinction between merchants and non-merchants (U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2005)
defines a merchant), and some of the Code’s terms offer customized rules for merchants. See, e.g., U.C.C. §
2-314 (2005) (imposing higher warranty standards by default on merchant sales). Some commentators have
raised the argument for having different rules of interpretation for sophisticated and non-sophisticated
parties. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 541, 569-70 (2003) (arguing that sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretation of contracts);
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 Yale L.J. 926, 944-6 (2010) (same).
For the argument for textualist interpretation for commercial contracts, see Lisa Bernstein, The
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 76 (1999).
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Even if for most consumer contracts the efficient rule is delivery at the seller’s place, this
is not necessarily the case in Example 1. The personally tailored default rule for
wheelchair-bound consumers, who can be identified easily as such, typically would be
delivery at the buyer’s place, since such delivery would reduce the parties’ total costs,
and be preferred by them.33 Indeed, with such a default rule, a seller would probably be
able to charge the disabled buyer a premium for delivery, and needless to say the buyer
(or seller) should be able to opt out of the personalized default rule if so he wishes. But as
long as no one opts out, delivery at the buyer’s place, in example 1, could be a better
default rule than the one commonly applied to able-bodied buyers.34
Now consider a more complicated example.
Example 2: Specific performance or damages. Steven is a classic rational actor.
He feels no personal attachment to property and changes his residence quite
often. Sarah holds Kantian moral values regarding keeping one’s promises, feels
personal attachment to property, rarely changes her place of residence and when
she does, she spends months searching for the perfect place. Both Steven and
Sarah entered into (separate) contracts to purchase homes from John, who is a
merchant in the business of selling homes. John breaches both contracts by
failing to deliver possession and title, and the question of the adequate remedy
arises. Assuming everything else about the contracts is equal, except the parties’
characteristics, should the court order the same remedy for Steven and Sarah?
Under current law the answer is typically yes. A possible qualification is that if John
could have reasonably understood while negotiating the contracts with Steven and Sarah,
that Steven preferred a damages remedy and Sarah preferred specific performance, the
court may take that into account in choosing the appropriate remedy. We argue that under
the assumption that the characteristics of the parties are verifiable by John and the courts,
a court ought to award damages to Steven and grant specific performance to Sarah.
Indeed, John may price the contract differently for Steven and Sarah, or at least offer
them different contractual terms, which would balance the additional costs that specific
performance entails for the seller.
In both examples discussed above, a choice should be made between two possible
default rules. Sometimes, however, a choice should be made between more than two
options, and then, following the logic of the majoritarian default rule theory, a
pluratlitarian default rule should be adopted.
33

See Cari Shields, et al. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts us, Inc., et al., 279 F.R.D. 529 (U.S. Dist.
2011). In a motion for class certification, plaintiffs, all visually impaired visitors of the Disney resorts in
California, allege that defendants discriminated against them. One of the arguments was that the audio
description devices provided by the defendant are designed to shut-off automatically after a given time, and
cannot be reset by visually impaired users. The court analyzed this argument in terms of design defect. One
could argue that the automatic shut-down is preferable for most users, thus making it the majoritarian
default rule, while plaintiffs are seeking to impose on defendant personalized default rule for visually
impaired visitors.
34

Business practices in American grocery stores track this default to some extent. A grocery bagger is
likely to ask an elderly customer with a large order whether she would like assistance unloading groceries
into her car, but probably will not bother asking a twenty-year old who has purchased a box of corn flakes
and a magazine the same question.
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C. Minoritarian (or Penalty) Default Rules
1. In General
In a seminal article published in 1989, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner identified a
second type of default rule, which they called the “Penalty Default Rule.”35 Unlike the
majoritarian default rule, the penalty default rule is not aimed at mimicking the
contractual term most parties prefer, but instead at penalizing the party whom has private
information that the other party does not have, in order to incentivize the former to reveal
that information to the latter, thereby facilitating an efficient contract.36
An example of a penalty default rule used by Ayres and Gertner was the
foreseeability requirement, set up in Hadley v. Baxendale.37 Under this requirement, the
aggrieved party is entitled to compensation only for foreseeable losses. Ayres and
Gertner explain that without the foreseeability limitation on liability, an aggrieved party
with unforeseeable losses would hide this information from the other party. The
foreseeability limitation penalizes an aggrieved party that hides the information by
barring recovery for his unforeseeable losses in case of a breach.38 In particular, if the
aggrieved party is not the cheapest cost avoider or the cheapest insurer of his
unforeseeable losses, he would disclose the potential losses to the other party. This
disclosure renders the losses foreseeable, and the other party would take them into
account in deciding whether to enter into the contract, how much to invest in precautions,
and whether to perform or breach.39
Several commentators criticized Ayres and Gertner penalty default rules theory
from several angles. It was argued that a penalty default rule, as described by Ayres and
Gertner, would not necessarily force revelation of private information by a contracting
party, because the revelation might directly contradict bargaining strategies,40 or because
35

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 91 ("Penalty defaults are defaults which are designed to give at least
one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose
affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.")

36

In other occasions, a penalty default rule would penalize both parties for concealing information that
makes the determination of their dispute easier for courts; in this way Ayres and Gertner explain the then
U.C.C. § 2-201 zero quantity provision, under which, if the parties have not agreed on the quantity, courts
would not fill in the gap in it and the contract will not be enforced. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 9596, note 43.
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Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).

38

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 101-4 (arguing that the decision in Hadley is an example of a penalty
default rule).
39

See Thomas Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract
Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984) (describing the various stages where the promisor takes decisions
and incentives matter); Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient
Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. (1988) 629 (same).
40

Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100
YALE L. J. 616 (1991) (arguing that the Hadley default penalty rule will not incentivize promisees to reveal
private information, since the revelation of the value the promisee ascribes to the the contract to the
promisor, would allow the promisor to raise the contract price substantially).
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the party with the private information might benefit from being pooled together with
other parties, thereby externalizing costs to them.41 Eric Posner prominently argued that
there are no penalty default rules in contract law, nor should there be any. The reason is
that both majoritarian default rules and penalty default rules force contracting parties with
private information, which prefer to opt out of the default rule, to reveal their private
information to the other party, who would offer them a different contract in exchange.
Opting out is costly, so a majoritarian default rule would function better than a penalty
default rule, since it encourages fewer parties to opt out. It is possible that the minority’s
total costs of opting out would exceed the majority’s total costs to opt out, but this is an
unlikely scenario. 42
We might better understand a penalty default rule as a species of minoritarian
default rule, as Ayres and Gertner acknowledged in an essay they published a decade
after they first proposed the penalty default rule idea.43 We believe that at least as
personalized default rules are concerned, there could be penalty default rules, or more
accurately, minoritarian default rules, as we explain below. We do suspect, however, that
the rise of Big Data (described in Part II) will make penalty default rules decreasingly
important, since firms are gaining access to a treasure trove of information about
individual consumers.
2. Minoritarian Default Rules and Personalized Default Rules
Minoritarian default rules could facilitate personalized majoritarian default rules.
Here’s how. If sellers and courts have full information about buyers, default rules aimed
at forcing buyers to reveal private information will be meaningless. Sellers and courts,
however, often do not have full information about buyers’ preferences, characteristics,
and traits, and tailoring default rules personally for them seems to be impractical. A
default rule could provide incentives for buyers to reveal their preferences,
characteristics, and traits to sellers, by penalizing those buyers who could convey such
information cheaply but nevertheless failed to do so.
Consider again example 2 (Specific Performance or Damages). Suppose sellers
and courts cannot distinguish accurately between Steven and Sarah, and therefore
41

Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999) (arguing
that parties with private information would not reveal their types when they enjoy from the crosssubsidization entailed by pooling them with other parties).
42

See Eric Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLORIDA STATE U. L. REV.
563 (2006) (arguing that examples of penalty default rules are either not default rules at all, or can be
explained by the majoritarian default rule theory); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Reconsidering
Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1615, 1624-6 (assessing
the Hadley default rule of limited liability, the authors argue that the rule entails some costs in different
situations, and should be adopted only in situations where the parties would have most likely wanted it in
advance, which makes it a majoritarian default rule); Johnston, supra note 40, at 622-3 (arguing that the
Hadley rule might be preferable by the parties ex-ante, and thus not a penalty rule).
43

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 1600-02 (explaining that penalty default rule is one type of
minoritarian default rule, which is efficient when it is less costly for the majority than the minority to opt
out).
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tailoring personalized default rules for them is currently impossible. Nevertheless, a
default rule of damages could change the outcome. If Sarah is aware of the damages
default rule, she will reveal her preferences for specific performance to the seller, or,
alternatively, reveal her characteristics and traits to him, from which he would be able to
deduce that unless they agree otherwise, her remedy will be specific performance. Thus,
the damages default rule will penalize Sarah if she does not convey information to the
seller about her preferences or characteristics.
Could specific performance function in the same way? Under a specific
performance default rule, Steven would arguably reveal neither his preference for
damages nor his characteristics and traits, because he is no worse off with specific
performance than with a damages remedy. Though he is indifferent between damages and
specific performance, he may be better off with specific performance, since that latter
remedy would improve his bargaining position vis-à-vis the seller, for whom specific
performance is typically more burdensome.44
But this analysis is incomplete. If the seller is able to structure the contract so as
to reward buyers who are entitled to the less burdensome remedy, then both damages and
specific performance could function effectively to force buyers to reveal their
preferences, characteristics and traits. Specifically, while a damages default rule would
penalize Sarah ex post if she does not reveal her preferences or characteristics, specific
performance would penalize Steven ex ante (higher price, or less favorable contractual
terms) if he does not reveal his preferences or characteristics. The choice between
damages and specific performance should therefore hinge on the empirical question of
whose costs of revealing his or her preferences or characteristics are lower: Steven or
Sarah’s? If the answer is Steven, specific performance should be the more efficient
default rule, and if it is Sarah, damages should be the most efficient default rule. Even if
there are more “Stevens” than “Sarahs” among buyers, but it is much less costly for
“Stevens” than for “Sarahs” to reveal their preferences or characteristics, specific
performance could be the efficient (minoritarian) default.
Under our personalized default rules theory parties do not directly negotiate the
terms of the contract, but instead reveal information about their characteristics and traits,
which in turn affect the contents of a set of default rules applied to them. That
information could often be private and even confidential: not every sensitive, neurotic
buyer would like to reveal these attributes to a seller. In other words, for some types of
characteristics and traits, the default rules could be stickier than for others, and the people
possessing the former characteristics and traits could be the minority. In the same way,
some types of parties may have significant cognitive limitations or biases that would
make it especially burdensome for them to reveal private information about their
preferences, and those parties could be the minority. Here a minoritarian default rule
could similarly work better than a majoritarian one.

44

Schwartz, supra note 29, at 274 (arguing that if damages are fully compensatory, adding the option of
specific performance creates an opportunity for the promisee to exploit the promisor by threatening to
compel performance when costs of performance are higher than the damages); Craswell, supra note 39, at
636-40 (same).
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D. Third Party Effects
Under a third approach to determining the content of default rules, default rules
should maximize social welfare in general, not necessarily the welfare of the contracting
parties. Contract law often takes negative effects on third parties as a central
consideration in enforcing contracts. For example, an entire chapter of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS is dedicated to “Unenforceability on Grounds of Public
Policy.”45 This chapter, however, is not about default rules, but instead about mandatory,
immutable rules: naturally, the parties are not allowed to opt out of those rules. Contract
law doctrines, however, only rarely take positive effects on third parties into account,46
and externalizing benefit default rules are rare.47
In some instances, the personalization of default rules may produce benefits to
third parties, or positive externalities, and the desire to promote such externalities may
convince society to embrace personalization. For example, many jurisdictions confront
the dilemma of how to encourage people to donate their organs after death to save other
people’s lives. A possible solution is to have a default rule that is expected to be quite
sticky: most people would not opt out, whatever the default rule is.48 Assuming the social
goal is to find an optimum between fulfilling people’s wishes and third parties’ benefits
(if those benefits were the only issue, a mandatory rule of donation would be the optimal
solution,49) tailoring personalized default rules to different groups in society could be an
optimal solution. Thus, if there are groups in society – say, adherents of Shintoism – who
are expected to object to organs’ donations, and would opt out of any default rule that
allows it,50 a no-donation default rule is the desirable one for them, since it would save
transaction costs of opting out. If instead there are other groups in society that might
oppose donation weakly but would not incur the costs of opting out, applying a default
rule that is not majoritarian but balances possible donors’ weak preferences against the
strong preferences of people on transplant waiting lists could better achieve the social
goal. Indeed, personalizing rules may dampen political opposition to the implementation
of default rules that produce positive externalities by “buying off” the interest groups that
are most likely to oppose a default rule that benefits third parties.

45

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178-199 (1981).

46

See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 207 (1981), according to which “[i]n choosing
among the reasonable meanings of a promise… a meaning that serves the public interest is generally
preferred.” See also Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1723-4 (1997) (discussing the aforementioned interpretation rule).
47

See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 1598-90 (discussing default rules which create positive
externalities).

48

Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1-2.

49

See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 807-08 (2005).

50

See Robert Steinbuch, Kidneys, Cash, and Kashrut: A Legal, Economic, and Religious Analysis of
Selling Kidneys, 45 HOU. L. REV. 1529, 1566 n. 268 (2009).
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II.

The Feasibility of Personalized Default Rules

Part I showed how majoritarian and penalty default rules might be personalized.
The discussion so far implicitly has contemplated two different sorts of personalized
default rules. One personalized default rule takes a particular, observable characteristic,
and sorts individuals into different legal defaults based on whether they possess that
characteristic. For example, if the state observes that men and women have systematically
different preferences for how their estates should be divvied up among heirs, then the law
might create one set of intestacy rules for men and another for women.51 Gender is easily
observable, so the costs of determining which set of intestacy rules apply will be low. We
can refer to similar approaches as “crude personalized default rules.”
Greater personalization is possible. Suppose that politically conservative and
politically liberal women have different preferences with respect to the division of their
estates. Suppose further that politically conservative women from cities and rural areas
systematically differ in the way they prefer to divide their estates. In theory, there are
multitudes of possible personalized default rules. Nevertheless, regularities exist, and the
task of using those regularities to establish sufficiently large groups of like-minded
individuals who can be assigned the same set of default rules confronts a tradeoff
between precision and complexity.52 We will refer to precise default rules that employ
many characteristics about individuals – including their past behaviors in similar
circumstances – to predict the contractual or testamentary terms they would have opted
for as “granular personalized default rules.” Breaking up the category further, granular
personalized default rules may or may not be based on knowledge of a specific
individual’s past behavior.
The feasibility of employing crude personalized default rules is a straightforward
matter. We need only show that a particular characteristic accurately predicts future
behavior. That said, we will show why using crude personalized default rules is often less
desirable than employing granular personalized default rules. In this Part, we therefore
will focus on the feasibility of those granular defaults. We agree with Sunstein’s
statement that although these sorts of personalized default rules seem “a bit like science
fiction . . . in the fullness of time, private and public institutions are likely to use a large
number of personalized default rules. In fact we are already heading in that direction.”53
A. Big Data and Big Five
An apparent hurdle in creating personalized default rules is the issue of
convenient ex post declarations. Suppose a legal dispute has arisen concerning ambiguity
in a contract. Once the nature and the stakes of the dispute are clear to both parties, each
will have an incentive to argue that she is the type of person who ought to be entitled to
the personalized default rule that would cause the court to rule in her favor. To take our
51

Assume for present purposes that such classifications are legally permissible. That assumption may be an
unreasonable one. We discuss the issue further infra Section III.D.

52

See infra Part III.C.

53

Sunstein, supra note 5, at 21.
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Example 2, both Steven and Sarah will argue that they are the types of people entitled to
specific performance if that remedy creates an entitlement that strengthens their
bargaining position relative to John.54 Is there a reliable way to prevent these problems of
proof? We believe that in the era of Big Data the answer to that question is yes.
Big Data is commonly defined as the process whereby computers sift through
enormous quantities of data to identify patterns that can predict individuals’ future
behavior.55 It depends on the combination of gigantic databases (typically cataloging
consumer behavior) with predictive analytics. Firms spent $28 billion on Big Data in
2012, a number that is estimated to grow to $34 billion in 2013.56 To put that $28 billion
number in perspective, it is an amount equal to the annual Gross Domestic Product of
Jordan or Latvia.57 Yet with greater growth potential.
What are these 28 billion dollars purchasing? It is hard to know for sure, since
many uses of Big Data are being kept as proprietary trade secrets. But in the past year,
the news media has reported on applications of Big Data to a dizzying array of industries.
Facebook’s new “social graphs” search feature seeks to employ that company’s Big
Database to better predict which search results will be most useful to individuals who
type in search queries.58 Big Data is a big industry in higher education.59 Big Data is a big
business in medicine.60 It is all the rage in insurance.61 Researchers have shown how by
analyzing on-line behavior they can predict an individual’s race,62 and how by
monitoring an individual’s television viewing habits, they can make accurate predictions
about her ideology.63 And the campaign to reelect President Obama was lauded (and
criticized) for its sophisticated use of Big Data techniques to identify and energize the
54

See supra Part I.B.2. and text accompanying notes 44.
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Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming
2013).
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Nick Kolakowski, Big Data Spending Will Hit 28 Billion in 2012, Slashdot, available at
http://slashdot.org/topic/bi/big-data-spending-will-hit-28-billion-in-2012-gartner/.
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See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp
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Somini Sengupta & Claire Cain Miller, Search Option from Facebook is a Privacy Test, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 18, 2013, at A1.

59

Marc Perry, Big Data on Campus, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2012, at ED24.
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available
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President’s partisans.64 These technologies have been employed to help businesses find
customers who will be profitable, patients who will need special care, voters who are
persuadable, and insureds who present good risks.65
Even brick and mortar outfits with familiar business models are using data-driven
strategies to personalize service in a way that will appeal to their customers. For example,
restaurants are increasingly assembling dossiers on customers, so that they will remember
whether particular patrons prefer black or white napkins, and red or white wine.66 This
information can then be shared with partner restaurants via Opentable.com’s reservation
database.67 With the benefit of this data, savvy restaurants can provide a first-time diner
with the same sort of personalized service that regulars from the neighborhood have long
come to expect.
Law is perhaps the primary major industry in which the effects of Big Data have
not been widely documented, although that is beginning to change, according to a
forthcoming article by Daniel Katz.68 Katz identifies numerous applications of Big Data
to the legal profession, suggesting its utility in predicting legal costs at the outset of a
case, predicting outcomes in litigation, helping firms hire the right attorneys, and
managing the discovery process.69 Our proposal suggests a different way in which the
legal system can leverage the benefits of Big Data. Under certain circumstances, we want
the courts (and advocates in the courtroom) to embrace the science of Big Data as a
means of deciding what terms ought to be imported into an ambiguous contract or will.
Journalists writing about Big Data have spilled much more ink discussing the fact
of Big Data’s proliferation than what makes it efficacious. At bottom, we believe a major
reason why Big Data enables firms and government entities to predict future behavior is
that patterns of purchases, mouse clicks, credit payments, and social network ties reveals
fundamental aspects of individuals’ personalities and values.70
Psychologists understand human behavior largely in terms of the “Big Five”
personality characteristics: Extraversion, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness,
and Openness.71 An enormous psychological literature has identified ways in which
particular personality traits are more pronounced among people who engage in particular
64

Obama Campaign’s Voter Data Crunching Paid Off, L.A. Times, Nov. 13, 2012.
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Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumer Buying Power, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 2012, at BU1
(profiling eBureau, a technology company that uses data mining to determine which individuals are likely
to be profitable customers for firms).
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Susanne Craig, Getting to Know You, N.Y. Times, Sep. 5, 2012, at D1.
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See, e.g., Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction – or – How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Start Preparing for the Data Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. __ (forthcoming
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sorts of behaviors.72 For example, people who score highly on extraversion are more
likely to disclose information about themselves on social networks,73 people who score
highly on conscientiousness are more likely to be politically conservative,74 and
Americans score noticeably higher on personality tests measuring agreeableness than do
Western Europeans.75 By employing Big Data, firms have found a substitute for
administering complex personality tests to all potential customers so that they can
identify everyone’s quirks and predilections.76 Because these firms are using publicly
available data and proprietary data that is bought and sold in the marketplace, they can
dispense with obtaining the consent of the individuals whose behavior is being studied.
Moreover, because they will be studying a consumers’ revealed preferences, rather than
her responses to surveys (which might be slanted in ways the consumer believes will
benefit her), firms may justifiably view the results of these quasi-personality tests as
particularly reliable metrics. We are not suggesting that the Big Five research unlocks
every behavioral mystery – the extant data suggests otherwise77 – but it surely identifies
numerous powerful tendencies among individuals and groups.
A fascinating new article by Gokul Chittaranjan, Jan Bloom, and Daniel GaticaPerez shows the promise and potential of using data mining to identify individuals’
personality profiles.78 These three scholars administered personality tests to scores of
Swiss smartphone users and then monitored the users’ smartphone activity over the next
17 months. They found numerous significant correlations between particular personality
traits and observed smartphone behavior. If you have someone’s cell phone and you
know what to look for, you know a lot about what makes them tick. Along the way they
showed that as a practical matter it is straightforward to analyze smartphone usage data
72

The legal literature employing “Big Five” analysis in a sophisticated way, by contrast, is relatively
sparse. For examples of successful interdisciplinary work of this sort, see Stuart P. Green & Matthew B.
Kugler, When Is It Wrong to Trade Stocks on the Basis of Non-Public Information? Public Views of the
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33 L. & PSYCH. REV. 93 (2009). Although it characterizes individuals in a way that diverges somewhat
from the Big Five framework, the Cultural Cognition Project has done the most influential legal work
applying research about personality heterogeneity to legal problems. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al.,
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automatically so as to predict the personalities of individual phone users. They
summarized some of their main findings as follows:
The results clearly show that several aggregated smart-phone usage
features could be predictive of the Big-Five personality traits. . . It was
found that extraverts, who are characterized by talkativeness and outgoing
nature, were more likely to receive calls and also spend more time on
them. . . . Agreeableness among women was associated with an increase in
the number of incoming calls. Agreeable men were found to communicate
with more number of unique contacts through voice calls. On the other
hand, conscientiousness was associated with higher usage of the Mail app,
which could be used in a professional context, and with lower usage of the
YouTube application, which is likely to be used for entertainment
purposes. Conscientious users were also likely to contact lesser number of
unique people through voice calls. This conforms with their
characterization in the literature as responsible and organized individuals.
Interestingly, emotional stability was linked to higher incoming SMS. And
high openness was associated with increased usage of Video / Audio /
Music apps in women and also with the usage of nonstandard calling
profiles such as Beep and Ascending in the entire population.
This is an extraordinarily rich set of findings, and it suggests that Verizon, AT & T,
Apple, Samsung, and other major firms in the cell phone industry possess a treasure chest
of personal information about the character of their customers. Yet their research has
been completely ignored by legal scholars. A follow-up Big Data project, in which a team
of researchers from MIT and the University of Trento analyzed social network ties and
personalities of cell phone users, suggests that in many respects behavioral data from
smart-phones can better predict individuals’ personalities than personality surveys
themselves.79 This hot-of-the-presses research confirms that behavioral data can predict
personality, and we already know from a vast psychology literature that personality can
predict behavior. The iPhones, not the eyes, turn out to be windows into the soul. That is
why Big Data is already a $28 billion industry.
To be sure, sometimes Big Data has predictive power because it teases out
regularities that have little to do with personality. For example, Target Corporation’s data
miners identified a pattern whereby their female customers who suddenly started
purchasing multivitamins and lotion were buying cribs and newborn diapers six months
later.80 Through analytics, Target realized that multivitamin and lotion purchases were an
early warning indicator about a biological change that was happening in pregnant
women’s bodies, which the women might otherwise be reluctant to reveal to Target.
Target used this information to its advantage, since its marketing psychologists
understood that the birth of a new child is a life-changing event that disrupts existing
79
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purchasing patterns. If Target could make new moms into loyal customers, there was a
greater chance that they could keep them as customers in the years and decades that
followed.81
B. Big Data in Litigation
Big Data can be used to predict future behavior because the process of studying
an individual’s purchases, online searches, voting behavior, borrowing activity, and
social network composition reveals aspects of that individual’s personality and
preferences. Of course, it is one thing for firms to employ analytics at a high level and
another matter entirely to think that lawyers or judges can duplicate the processes that
were employed at a high level by Fortune 500 companies and successful presidential
reelection campaigns. The institutional competence concerns are legitimate, especially at
the present, when courts have developed no expertise in profiling and Big Data generally.
Nevertheless, we submit that in conjunction with social science research and an
adversarial system whereby litigants’ counsel educate judges and juries, Big Data
techniques already can generate a set of crude personalized default rules to resolve
matters that are frequently the subject of litigation. We would envision psychological
evidence coming before the court via expert testimony, so it would of course be subject to
Daubert82 and the rules that generally govern evidence admissibility, with liberal use of
in camera proceedings where proprietary algorithms need to be evaluated. As the science
advances, we believe that skilled legal counsel and these expert witnesses can help the
law shift towards increasingly granular personalized default rules. The legally relevant
question would be the parties’ characteristics and traits at the time the contract was
entered into (or, in the case of probate matters, at the decedent’s death), as well as past
behavior of the parties involved. In our world of Big Data and nearly infinite storage
capacity, this sort of information should be readily accessible.
Because personalized, Big Data-driven default rules can work in litigation, they
should be predictable by the parties when creating their rights and duties, and prove
useful to parties seeking to settle their disputes in the shadow of the law. Firms are
already accessing and analyzing the profiles of individual consumers for marketing,
pricing, and quality assurance purposes anyway, and the individual consumer usually
knows her own true preferences and characteristics reasonably well. It is therefore
plausible that many of these cases can settle without the need for experts to be hired and
summary judgment motions to be resolved. We have already shown how Big Data and
personalization could change the law of inheritance.83 Let us now consider other
important applications.
1. Consumer Contracts
The most natural field to apply the personalized default rules approach is
consumer law. As we have explained, firms have an increasingly enormous amount of
data on consumers’ preferences and characteristics. This data can be used to tailor
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different default rules for their contracts. This same data can be utilized by the parties to
settle disputes in the shadow of the law, as well as by the courts. Since consumers are
generally aware of their characteristics and traits, they will find the personalized default
rules more predictable than the impersonal default rules currently applied to their
contracts.
Consider Example 1 (Place of Delivery) first, which suggests that while a default
rule for able-bodied consumers could be “delivery at the seller’s place of business,” a
“delivery at the buyer’s residence” might be a better default rule for disabled consumers.
There is no need for much data to employ a personalized default rule approach in this
case, and we would not be surprised to see courts reaching the same result through
interpretation techniques.
In some industries, a default rule of “delivery at the buyer’s residence” could be
an efficient minoritarian default rule, which would facilitate personalized default rules.
Thus, a store selling medical equipment, might have a relatively high number – but still
minority – of consumers who are disabled. Some of the disabilities may be visually
hidden, and the disabled consumers might prefer not to disclose their disabilities verbally,
especially if other customers are nearby. A default rule of “delivery at the buyer’s place”
would encourage able-bodied consumers to ask for delivery at the seller’s place, with a
possible price discount.
2. Medical Malpractice
The personalized default approach could work in the medical malpractice context.
Suppose that a doctor has prescribed a drug that, when taken for a prolonged period of
time, causes a very unfortunate side effect in a very small number of cases (say, one in
every 500,000 cases). The drug is most effective when taken for a prolonged period of
time, but still somewhat effective when taken for just a week or two. The doctor fails to
warn the patient about this particular side effect. A patient suffers the rare side effect and
then sues the doctor for malpractice, alleging a failure to obtain informed consent. A key
focus of the legal inquiry will be causation: Would the patient have consented to undergo
the treatment even if she had been warned about the side effect? As long as the doctor has
no concrete information about the particular patient’s wishes or expectations regarding
disclosure,
present
law
treats
this
inquiry
as
an
objective
one:
84
What would a reasonably prudent patient have done?
Our approach contemplates a rule whereby a physician can tailor her disclosure of
risks to particular patients – even though she has no concrete information about the
particular patient’s wishes or expectations regarding disclosure. She will then be judged
based on whether her disclosure was appropriate for a particular patient type (not the
hypothetical reasonably prudent patient.)
Big Data firms like the Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) have already gotten into the
business of using data mining to predict patients’ future behavior, with the firm having
launched FICO Adherence Scoring recently. FICO adherence scores use information
from a patient’s credit report to predict the likelihood that a patient will regularly take his
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prescription medication and otherwise adhere to medical advice.85 Suppose a doctor
consulted a patient’s FICO adherence score and FICO predicted that there was only a 5%
chance that the patient would take the medication for long enough to render the side
effect a possibility. The doctor does some quick math and determines that the risk that
this particular patient would suffer the side effect is 1 in 10 million. Given that any
warning may cause psychosomatic symptoms or raise the likelihood of cognitive errors
by the patient, the doctor elects not to warn the patient.86 On our analysis, a default rule
of non-disclosure would be appropriate for this particular patient.
At the same time, if the same doctor was treating a different patient, one for
whom FICO predicted a 95% chance that the patient would continue taking the
medication for long enough to trigger a possible side effect, then the court’s ruling could
well come out differently. The odds of the side effect occurring for this patient are
approximately 1 in 526,000, and those odds, while remote, might still be sufficient to
warrant disclosure to the patient. Personalizing the default rule permits the physician to
practice personalized medicine to a much greater degree, a development that could
substantially advance the efficiency of health care delivery.87
Pushing the point further, we might imagine ways in which other forms of Big
Data could affect the informed consent calculus. One of the other things that credit
scoring can do is assess an individual’s tolerance for risk. Risk is apparently correlated
across a number of life activities, such that individuals who drive in a risky manner make
risky personal financial decisions as well.88 Suppose that a plaintiff’s consumer behavior
profile reveals her to be an extremely cautious person. In that case the law might impose
heightened disclosure requirements on the physician. If the patient’s profile reveals her to
be a devil-may-care consumer, then giving short shrift to disclosures of low risks may be
appropriate for the physician in a world where disclosure may be both time consuming
and potentially harmful to the patient’s emotional well-being. Such an approach to
adjudicating medical malpractice cases, where the patient’s profile at the time the
medication was prescribed is part of the factual record before the court, may help steer
adjudicators away from the dangers of hindsight bias. In such cases the judge or jury
knows that a bad outcome has occurred and is tempted to think that a reasonable patient
would have wanted to know about the possibility of such an outcome, even though the ex
ante risk of such an outcome was extremely remote.89
The (hopefully rare) patient who is misunderstood by FICO or other providers of
analytics, would have the chance to opt out. Under a new version of informed consent,
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the physician may tell a patient, “this is the sort of person our analytics contractor thinks
you are. If we have misunderstood you, please tell us now, because it will affect the facts
I disclose to you and the circumstances that will prompt me to ask for further consent or
clarification.”90 We will say more about this sort of personalized disclosure in Part IV.
In other contexts personalized informed consent default rules could further the
interests of third parties. Consider vaccination: children are vaccinated from diseases but
it is often in a particular child’s best interest, strictly speaking, not to take the vaccine –
which has possible side effects – because the rest of the population is vaccinated. To
avoid such free-riding a mandatory law could force vaccination. A softer approach would
be to have an impersonal default rule according to which doctors could say nothing about
side effects, unless asked, and go forward with vaccination, unless told otherwise. A still
better approach in a world where, say, 80-90% vaccination suffices to confer herd
immunity and 10% of the population are likely to suffer side effects from vaccination,
would be to personalize the disclosure default. For example, the “no information unless
the patient asked” default rule would not apply to patients whose attributes correlate most
closely with those patients who have suffered side effects in FDA trials.
3. Landlord-Tenant Law
We believe that personalized default rules are appropriate in adjudication of
disputes in property law as well. Suppose a landlord and tenant are involved in litigation.
The tenant lives alone and has rented a two bedroom apartment for $600 a month in a
neighborhood where the average similarly sized apartment rents for twice that amount.
The written lease specifies the rent, the term, and various other factors, but says nothing
about the quality of the apartment. Now suppose that a few months after the tenant moves
in, plaster begins falling from the ceiling in the second bedroom, causing it to be an
unsafe space for sleeping, though the tenant continues to use the bedroom for storing
personal belongings. Has the condition in the second bedroom amounted to a breach of
the lease, such that if the ceiling is not repaired upon request the tenant can move out and
need not pay further rent? In most American jurisdictions, the answer to that question
would be yes. The condition of the ceiling constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, which is read into every landlord-tenant contract.91 But some jurisdictions
treat the implied warranty of habitability as a default provision that the parties can waive
via explicit contract terms.92
American law has largely stuck with a one-size fits all approach to the implied
warranty of habitability, though the limited exceptions are important for our purposes. As
a general matter, the implied warranty of habitability will be read into any residential
lease. But some jurisdictions hold that there will be no implied warranty of habitability
when the tenant rents a single family home (as opposed to a unit in a multi-unit
building,)93 and other jurisdictions hold that there is nothing akin to an implied warranty
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of habitability when non-residential properties are leased.94 This granularity of the rules
is based on suppositions by common law courts that particular variables governing
property ought to affect the tenant’s substantive legal rights.95
Our approach to personalized default rules posits that the characteristics of the
tenant (and landlord) may be as relevant to determining the appropriate missing term to
impose on the contract, particularly when the landlord has access to the information
relating to the tenant’s past behavior, characteristics, and traits, or to data indicating what
are the suitable default rules for the tenant. Is the tenant an individual who routinely
bargain hunts, and is willing to sacrifice quality in return for cost savings? If so, the court
plausibly ought to view the lease as lacking an implied warranty of habitability. Is the
tenant someone who regularly stays in nice hotels, pays for weekly maid service, and
otherwise indicates a propensity for paying for comfort and pleasing aesthetics? If so, the
court plausibly ought to view the lease as containing an implied warranty of habitability.
Does the tenant score high on personality metrics measuring Neuroticism, such that the
prospect of problems with the ceiling will keep her awake at night, or is she a highly
emotionally stable person who may be annoyed but won’t be made anxious by her
substandard ceiling?
We are not suggesting that these intuitive correlations among purchasing history,
personality, and expectations for an apartment are air-tight. We are articulating falsifiable
hypotheses that ought to be tested empirically. But consumer profilers have been able to
analyze a broad swath of personal information relating to transactions, and to use
algorithms to identify “value oriented” or “Rodeo Drive Chic” consumers for marketing
purposes since at least the mid-1990s.96
4. Labor Law
American labor law is not often thought of in terms of default rules, but defaults
are very important in that field. More precisely, the default provision under the National
Labor Relations Act is that workers are not unionized. If a group of workers mounts a
unionization drive and a majority of the workers (or, in some cases, a majority of a subset
of the non-management workers) within a workplace vote to unionize, then a union will
be certified, and it will be authorized to bargain collectively on behalf of all the workers
as a whole.97 Union certification efforts can be cumbersome, expensive, and contentious.
At the same time, it seems plausible that the default rule American law has chosen is an
appropriate one on majoritarian grounds – most American workers are non-unionized and
have chosen to be non-unionized for quite some time.98
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Psychological studies have shown that personality characteristics correlate
strongly with membership in a voluntary union. In particular, the Big Five traits of
Extraversion and Neuroticism both predict union membership, and the interaction of
those two traits predicts union membership very strongly.99 Big Five personality
characteristics also predict which industries individuals are likely to be drawn to, and
which individuals are most likely to thrive and retain their jobs in particular industries.
For example, nurses who report high levels of Neuroticism are much more likely to
experience emotional exhaustion and burnout, which may cause them to leave nursing,
though nurses with high levels of Extraversion are likely to avoid burnout.100 While
politicians score very high on Extraversion and Openness, bureaucrats in the same
jurisdictions do not.101 Managers and sales representatives show high levels of
Extraversion,102 and high levels of Neuroticism appear to be common among the
unemployed.103
This kind of data suggests a radical possibility, which is that certain workplaces or
industries, especially those containing high numbers of very extraverted and neurotic
individuals, might be deemed unionized by default.104 Given the underrepresentation of
highly neurotic individuals in the workforce, the non-unionized default plausibly makes
sense for most workplaces.
At this point we want to identify this kind of workplace profiling to determine the
default rule as a theoretical possibility, rather than something we are advocating.
Correlations and causation are distinct, and the factors that drive union membership
continue to be debated.105 For example, it is plausible that Extraversion and Neuroticism
explain the success of unionization campaigns, rather than workers’ underlying
preference for union membership. It is even conceivable that correlation runs in the
opposite direction, and participation in a union makes workers more extroverted and
neurotic. We would need to get a fuller sense of these causal variables before offering
prescriptions for labor law. That said, depending on the results of future research, a prounionization default rule could be appropriate in some contexts.
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C. Big Data Guinea Pigs
Countries with enormous populations ought to take advantage of economies of
scale. In this case that means foregoing the need to carefully monitor the choices of all
their citizens, and perhaps sidestepping some of the problems from inefficient social
norms in the process. We therefore propose that American law ask one million residents
to make active choices about their preferences, provide modest compensation to these
guinea pigs for the transaction costs they have incurred, and then data mine to identify
ways in which the 314 million individual Americans are similar to any of the 1 million
guinea pigs. The106 guinea pigs’ active choices would become the personalized default
choices for the people most similar to them across a variety of observable metrics. These
surveys could be conducted via a government agency, like the Census Bureau or United
States Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or an industry consortium.
A great deal of contract law scholarship worries about the extent to which
consumers are rushed or inattentive and pay little attention to contract terms as a result.107
Yet if one in every 315 people is a compensated contract law guinea pig,108 then the law
might reasonably devote substantial resources to making sure that those guinea pigs are
very well-informed and have adequate time to consider the contractual options and
associated tradeoffs. They can spend time reading the fine print so we don’t have to. And
once we have a large dataset tracking the choices of these guinea pigs, we can identify
behavioral patterns and give each consumer contractual terms that mimic those chosen by
the guinea pigs with the personalities and attributes most similar to hers. Typically, only
the choice made by the guinea pigs prior to the time the contract at issue was executed
would matter. But some parties to a contract may prefer to let guinea pigs’ subsequent
choices affect the contract’s terms too, and we would certainly permit such arrangements.
Our “sampling” strategy mirrors the sorts of extrapolations used routinely by
demographers and survey researchers.109 Such strategies are already used for predictive
purposes in the private sector. For example, Netflix’s Cinematch algorithm for movie
ratings (a) analyzes the one- to five-star ratings provided by its users after they have seen
a movie, (b) matches each user’s ratings against the ratings of other users in the Netflix
database, and (c) uses these similarity scores to predict how well users will like particular
movies, so that users can employ these predictions in deciding whether they ought to rent
or download a movie.110 The more films a user rates, the better the algorithm can
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personalize that user’s movie recommendations and the recommendations of similar
Netflix customers.
Of course, rating each movie you have watched on Netflix entails an active
choice. Many users of Netflix do not bother to evaluate movies they have seen, perhaps
because it takes time to do so.111 And many Netflix users similarly do not use the “taste
preferences” features on Netflix, which permit users to specify how often they watch
movies that can be characterized as “absurd,” “bawdy,” “cerebral,” “dark”, etc.112 One of
the potential benefits of personalized default rules in a world of Big Data is that much of
the data used to generate similarity scores and personalized defaults will be generated
automatically, without the need for a user to do anything. It is almost tantamount to
Netflix monitoring how many times a viewer laughed during a comedy, cried during a
tragedy, or gasped during a horror flick.
A more modest alternative to guinea pigs would be to generate information
necessary for personalizing default rules by asking individuals about their general
preferences, characteristics and traits, and using this information to tailor default rules for
them. An agency might distribute questionnaires to consumers, explaining that the
answers will be used for personalizing default rules in their interactions with merchants.
We predict that many consumers will answer the questionnaires, which should not be too
intrusive, with the understanding that their answers would facilitate their receiving deals
better adapted to their true preferences. The gist of the approach is to use information
culled from a survey to modify all the defaults that a consumer will encounter. This
blanket approach to personalizing default rules seems far more efficient than selective
modifications of contractual boilerplate on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
Sampling has different implications when it is used to anticipate the preferences
of a consumer and those of a producer. There are hundreds of millions of American
consumers, and finding reasonable matches for each of them will not be terribly difficult
most of the time. Large firms are few in number, and it is difficult to identify firms as
having particular personalities. They are supposed to be rational profit maximizers, after
all. In any event, in modern, high-stakes transactions it is becoming increasingly common
for sellers to have information about the consumers they are dealing with, so that they can
decide on pricing and service quality, pinpoint potentially fraudulent transactions, and
evaluate the effectiveness of their marketing strategies.113 As the information age
proceeds, it will be reasonable to assume that sellers “know their customers” and either
already are or can easily become familiar with the personalized default rules that
correspond to particular customers.
Consumers are less likely to have this sort of information about individual firms’
propensities, though in the case of large national firms or local firms with extensive Yelp
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profiles, the information asymmetries may be less pronounced. Imposing on consumers a
burden to “know their sellers” is less justifiable, particularly when they are dealing with
small-scale sellers in non-repeat-play environments.114
III. Possible Objections and Limitations
Part II articulated a rather bold vision of personalized default rules. In this part,
we want to confront some potential objections to our proposal, conceding that some of
them warrant limits on the appropriate scope for personalized default rules.
A. Cross Subsidies
An obvious objection to our proposal relates to the equities of crosssubsidization. In our analysis, two consumers might buy the same product for the same
price and, ex post, receive a different set of contractual rights as part of that transaction.
In such circumstances it is tempting to critique our proposal by emphasizing the crosssubsidy from the buyer who receives less generous contractual terms to the buyer who
receives more generous contractual terms. Consider the following example:
Example 3: Right to Return. Dana is conservative, very careful in her behavior
in all fields of life. She is a cautious consumer: before she buys anything, she
consults Consumer Reports and asks for her friends’ advice. In the past, she has
never returned a product she bought, unless it was defective. Jim is a risk-taker,
quite impulsive, and is easily excited. He makes decisions fast, without
consulting anyone. In the past he returned products he bought several times, just
because he realized he should not have bought them in the first place. Both Dana
and Jim have separately bought at the same store a new flat-screen television.
After a day of use they realized that this purchase was a mistake. They want to
return the product and get their money back. Should they be treated in the same
manner?
Under current law, the answer is yes. Whether the default rule is a “right to return”115 or
“no right to return,” it would be applied equally to Dana and Jim. If, however,
personalized default rules are permitted and feasible, it might be the case that only Dana
should be entitled to return the product and get her money back, while Jim would not be
allowed to do so. The reason is simple: if Dana and Jim had separately negotiated the
right to return with the seller, the outcome would probably be different in the two cases;
while Dana might have preferred to have that right, Jim might have preferred not to have
it.
At first glance this might seem odd: Jim appears to need the right to return more
than Dana. But that “urgent” need is contingent on the current default rule under which
both Dana and Jim are entitled to the right to return, and pay the same premium – through
the contract price – for having that right. Under the current default rule, careful Dana
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subsidizes hasty Jim. Under current law, Dana rarely uses her right to return while Jim
uses it very often, but they pay the same premium. Adverse selection could result.116 If
instead, only Dana would be entitled to use that right, since she uses it very rarely, the
cross-subsidization would be diminished.
The result under current law is not only unjust but also inefficient: Dana pays too
much for the product, and her consumer surplus is too low, and Jim pays too little for the
product and his consumer surplus is too high. If instead they had paid for the right to
return the accurate premium tailored for each of them, Jim would have been required to
pay a higher price than Dana. As a result, Jim might have preferred not to have a right to
return, and to be more careful in his decisions to buy products. In the long run, he might
become someone who prefers to have the right to return, even at a higher, tailored price.
As for Dana, since she is already careful in her purchase decisions, having the right to
return for a personally tailored premium meets her current needs. Therefore, different
default rules seem to be what Dana and Jim would have preferred, if the premiums for the
right to return had been personalized. Thus, we argue, different default rules should be
applied to them.
Sometimes sellers would not be able to distinguish between Dana-like and Jimlike consumers, and consequently personalized default rules would not be feasible,
resulting in cross-subsidization. A possible strategy to avoid cross-subsidization would be
to have a majoritarian or minoritarian default rule that would incentivize one party to
reveal his type to the seller, and get the contract that fits him best. This brings us to our
next objection.
B. Strategic Behavior
Crude personalized default rules tied to an individual’s immutable characteristics,
such as sex or age, alleviate significant concerns about strategic behavior. Under our
proposal for granular personalized default rules, however, the products and services that
an individual buys, the keywords he searches for, the company he keeps, and various
other aspects of an individual’s behavior can influence the terms under which he will
purchase goods and services. When an individual consumer changes his behavior, he is
simultaneously changing the identities of the guinea pigs to whom he will be compared.
In effect, the consumer trades in the default rules selected by the guinea pigs who
behaved similarly to him at an earlier date for the default rules selected by the guinea pigs
who behaved similarly to the “new him.” Given this possibility, there is a danger that
individual consumers will engage in strategic behavior, so that they are compared to the
guinea pigs who have selected the most generous default terms.
To take a salient example of this, a Canadian credit card issuer determined during
the last decade that consumers who purchase carbon monoxide detectors or felt pads to be
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placed at the bottom of chair and furniture legs are exceptionally good credit risks.117
Evidently, people concerned about the dangers of carbon monoxide or preventing
scratches on hard wood floors are extremely careful, conscientious individuals with low
discount rates; precisely the sort of people likely to pay back loans on time.118 Before it
publicized this finding, the credit card issuer could use knowledge of felt pad and carbon
monoxide detector purchases to price risk. But as soon as the correlation became public,
its value diminished substantially. After all, felt pads and carbon monoxide detectors are
relatively inexpensive compared to home mortgages loans. It would be in everyone’s
interests to stock up on these household products a few months before seeking to
purchase a home, even if they had no intention of putting these items to their ordinary
use. The strategic purchase of these felt pads and carbon monoxide detectors would
therefore function as a smoke screen.119
Although the problem of strategic behavior is always an issue, we do not think it
is a particularly troublesome one in this context. First, a great deal of predictive analytics
is and will remain proprietary. Guessing which products function as felt pads will not be
easy, and people who discover how to game the system will have little incentive to
publicly disclose their success stories. Second, even when it becomes clear that certain
types of behavior will be associated with more beneficial default terms in some contexts,
employing smokescreens is costly. If people regularly purchase products they don’t need,
become Facebook friends with people they don’t like, or develop hobbies they don’t
enjoy so as to enhance the quality of their personalized default profiles, they often will be
making themselves worse off. Changing one’s behavior is a costly signal; it is not cheap
talk. Much of the time it will be easier to just specify a different contractual term at the
time a contract is entered into, or pay a higher price, rather than putting on an elaborate
and costly performance to achieve the same result. Third, while keeping up a charade
may be easy for a short period of time, it gets harder for the consumer (and easier to
detect by the seller) with every passing day. Thus, in Example 3 (Right to Return), if
hasty Jim pretended to be careful Jim, and got a right to return, after several instances of
abusing that right, merchants would recognize his true character and treat him
accordingly. Fourth, on many occasions consumers will not really benefit from
pretending to be what they are not: having a specific character could benefit a consumer
in one context but harm him in another context, and on many occasions would bring him
a default rule that does not fit him personally.
While we think strategic behavior is a manageable problem associated with
personalized default rules, the problem would be magnified if personalization expanded
beyond waivable defaults. It is possible that personalized default rules will become so
engrained that sellers essentially refuse to bargain around them. In other words, firms
might be willing to offer consumers contracts with personalized terms, but might view
negotiation away from those personalized terms as prohibitive on transaction cost
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grounds. Such a development, away from personalized default rules and towards
unwaivable “personalized terms” strikes us a sufficiently thorny topic to warrant an
article of its own. We suspect society is unlikely to need to cross that bridge, at least in
the immediate future, in part because the strategic behavior problem would be
substantially magnified in a world where most terms were non-negotiable.
C. Uncertainty
According to a third objection, adopting a personalized default rules regime
increases uncertainty thereby making the law less effective in guiding people’s behavior.
It may also increase the costs of adjudication.120. Impersonal default rules avoid these
drawbacks. Uncertainty would be ameliorated by approaches to contract law that lock in
the choices made by guinea pigs prior to the contract’s execution. Any subsequent shifts
in the choices of guinea pigs would be irrelevant to the meaning of a contract. That is the
approach we envision here, though some parties could instead opt to reject this model,
with the presumptive consequences being less certainty about a contract’s meaning and a
higher likelihood that the terms of a contract will better reflect changed circumstances.
To better understand the uncertainty objection to a personalized default rules
regime, reconsider Example 3 (Right to Return). If there is a “one size fits all” default
rule, of either a right to return or no right to return, contractual parties could clearly
understand whether in a specific transaction they have such a right. In the same way, if
the choice of remedy is not contingent on the buyers’ characteristics and traits, in
Example 2 (Damages or Specific Performance), both Steven and Sarah could know in
advance that in the event of a breach they are entitled to specific performance (or
damages), regardless of the inferences which could be derived from their particular traits.
With personalized default rules there is more uncertainty: in the two abovementioned
examples, contractual parties would find it harder to contemplate their substantive rights
and remedies.121
The choice between personalized default rules and impersonal default rules only
loosely tracks the choice between rules and standards, which has been thoroughly
analyzed by commentators.122 Most importantly, rules are more costly to create while
standards are more costly for individuals to interpret when deciding how to behave and
for adjudicator to apply to past behaviors.123
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At first glance an impersonal default rule seems to resemble a rule, while a
personalized default rule seems to resemble a standard. Thus, in Examples 3 and 2 which
are mentioned above, an impersonal default rule (such as “right to return” or “damages”,
respectively) is a rule, while a personalized default rule is a standard.
The rules versus standards dichotomy is not identical to the impersonal versus
personalized default rules dichotomy. In particular, there could be impersonal default
rules which are standards (e.g., a duty of good faith) and personalized default rules which
are rules (e.g., different intestacy rules for men and women).124 Therefore, the crucial
question with personalized default rules is how to balance uncertainty with accuracy, to
better reduce transaction costs and encourage desirable behaviors. In general, as
personalized default rules are more specifically tailored they would work better than
impersonal default rules if the degree of certainty, to both the parties and court, is
relatively high. Conversely, when the degree of certainty is low, and the parties find it
hard to anticipate what content courts would give to the personalized default rule, then an
impersonal default rule could work better than the personalized default rule, as long as
the former creates more certainty than the latter.
Would a personalized default rule be typically associated with less certainty than
an impersonal default rule? Not necessarily. A consumer living in a world with
impersonal default rules needs to invest resources in learning the contents of the default
rule (or bear the risks of not doing so). A consumer living in a world with personalized
default rules needs to invest resources in learning the content of whichever default rule
applies to him, and he may need to research other plausibly applicable default rules along
the way. Critically, the consumer already knows a great deal about his preferences and
characteristics, which are the factors driving the choice among multiple personalized
default rules. Assuming that Big Data does what it is supposed to do – identify patterns of
behavior among similarly situated people – then the consumer will be able to intuit the
law’s contents, based on what he, himself, would want, which would be a good proxy for
what guinea pigs just like him chose. It is therefore conceivable that the average
consumer can discern the contents of applicable personalized default rules at a lower cost
than he can discern the contents of an impersonal default rule, and that there is a greater
likelihood he can do so without consulting a lawyer.125
A caveat is in order. In our model the guinea pigs will be given more time and
resources to make decisions, and it is conceivable that this extra time will cause them to
make decisions that differ from the snap judgments they (and those like them) would
have made. If this gap is large, the effect will be greater consumer uncertainty combined
with greater consumer satisfaction with their default choices. That seems likely to be, at
worst, a wash. Over time, it is conceivable that many consumers will stop worrying so
much about uncertainty, in the same way that consumers quickly overcame their
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widespread initial reluctance to purchase products over the Internet using credit cards.126
For those consumers who remain untrusting, our proposal for personalized disclosure in
Part IV offers a novel strategy for ameliorating the uncertainty problem.
In contracts between two consumers, especially consumers involved in non-repeat
play interactions, the uncertainty will rise dramatically, which is why we are quite
skeptical about using personalized default rules in those contexts. But in contracts
between a consumer and a profit-maximizing firm, or between consumers involved in
repeat-play interactions, the cognitive load faced directly by consumers should be more
manageable.127 Contracting firms may face information asymmetries regarding consumer
preferences, but obviously reducing those asymmetries is one of the Big Data industry’s
chief objectives.
Of course, if judges are not skilled at identifying litigants’ characteristics and
preferences, then the cognitive loads faced by adjudicators will rise as a result of the shift
from impersonal default rules to personalized default rules. And as these cognitive loads
rise, the risk of judicial error rises, which will engender uncertainty for the parties
themselves, even if these parties have perfect information about their own preferences
and characteristics. As this analysis shows, the heightened uncertainty created by
personalized default rules is likely to emerge indirectly, as a “shadow of the law” effect.
Even if personalized default rules invariably enhance uncertainty because of these
dynamics, there are plenty of cases where personalized default rules promote accuracy,
with little effect on certainty. Such is the case with our inheritance law example and other
cases where the default rule is tailored according to a salient and easily observable
characteristic such as sex or age. Where a personalized rule is particular to a defined
social group (e.g., a default of no organ donation among Shintos), we can expect that
group members will learn the contents of the crude personalized default rule without
having to investigate it.128 That brings us to a closely related objection: caselaw
fragmentation, which is our next topic.
D. Caselaw Fragmentation
Impersonal default rules minimize the fragmentation of the case law that resolves
contractual ambiguity. That is a key advantage. Personalized default rules, by contrast,
would engender greater fragmentation in the legal precedents. That feature is a real
drawback associated with personalized default rules, one that may prove decisive in some
cases.
Presently, if a court interprets ambiguous contractual language, its interpretation
will possess precedential value and help clarify the law in future disputes arising out of
ambiguity. The precedential effect is most powerful with respect to any future dispute
arising between the same parties concerning the same ambiguity. In such a case, the
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earlier precedent has preclusive effect. Even here, though, the same contractual language
may be construed to mean different things if the court identifies pertinent differences in
the context of the negotiation.129 Certainly, however, the interpretation of language will
play a significant role in mitigating subsequent judicial uncertainty about the language’s
meaning in future disputes.130 But the precedent may help reduce uncertainty with respect
to similarly situated parties and similar contractual ambiguities. To be sure, lawyers and
judges will be able to distinguish precedents that are closely on point if they are
sufficiently motivated to do so, but the greater the similarity in the language at issue the
more difficult it will be to do so on contextual or other grounds.
With personalized default rules, distinguishing a precedent a judge does not like
becomes easier. Even if the contractual language at issue in an earlier case is identical to
the language at issue in the case before the court, a party might appropriately argue that
the litigant in the earlier case and the litigant in the subsequent case have sufficiently
different personalities, attributes, and profiles to warrant divergent interpretations of the
ambiguity. No two human beings are identical in every respect, so the court will have to
confront the question of whether litigant heterogeneity warrants a different result in the
face of linguistic and contextual homogeneity. This fragmentation of precedent seems
poised to enhance uncertainty about the law’s content. Where this problem is particularly
pronounced it warrants skepticism with respect to personalized default rules.
The question is one of tradeoffs, and it is not obvious whether the costs associated
with indirect uncertainty and caselaw fragmentation exceed the benefits associated with
giving a far greater number of individuals default rules that approximate their preferences
more closely than impersonal default rules presently do (if one adopts the majoritarian
default rule theory). To the extent that readers are concerned about excessive
fragmentation, they might support a scaled back version of our proposal, whereby
personalized default rules could be employed only to deal with contractual silence, and
not to deal with contractual ambiguity. Under this modified approach, identical
contractual language would usually mean identical things to different people, but the
absence of a contractual provision would have differing implications for different parties.
It is worth noting that courts have occasionally confronted this issue of
fragmentation before. In one prominent en banc decision, the Federal Circuit held that
interpreting identical contractual language to mean different things in different contexts
was justified, despite protests about the extent to which such results will destabilize
existing contracts.131 If such an approach to interpretation is occasionally permissible
when courts are engaged in ex post holistic analyses of contractual meaning, then it ought
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to be more palatable if undertaken in a rigorous, data-driven, ex ante way, which is our
aspiration in advocating personalized default rules.132 We therefore conclude that
uncertainty and precedent fragmentation are important but not inevitably decisive
considerations in deciding on the desirability of personalized default rules.
E. Statistics and Stereotyping
A possible objection to our proposal is similar to the one raised against profiling
in law enforcement, or more generally, against the usage of statistical data for
determining rights and duties. Statistical data does not focus on the individual parties;
instead, it purports to establish factual findings, and allocating rights and duties, by using
generalizations concerning the group to which the individuals belong, e.g., their sex, age,
race, religion, or any other indicator correlated with the missing facts.133 This may
contradict many people’s moral intuitions. Furthermore, using statistical data create
stereotypes, by ascribing to people attributes they may not have.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the pros and cons of using
statistical data for allocating rights and duties, and for law enforcement. We note,
however, that any default rule, impersonal or personalized, is statistical in nature, because
it ascribes rights and duties to individuals according to averaged preferences of an entire
population or a subset of people. Personalized default rules are just a better proxy – based
on more accurate statistics – as to the preferences of the specific party.
Therefore, the objection to our proposal is not the usage of statistical data as such
– this kind of data should be used anyway with any type of default rules – but instead that
it creates stereotypes we may want to avoid. Take the intestacy example: using different
default rules for men and women, according to which, when there is no will, most of a
mother’s estate goes to the children while most of the fathers’ estate goes to their spouses
could create (or strengthen) a stereotype that mothers care more about their children than
fathers. We consider this objection in the next section.
F. Subordination, Adaptive Preferences, and Personalization
Sunstein’s paper on default rules provides an arresting example of an American
default rule that may be simultaneously anti-majoritarian and constitutionally compelled.
Sunstein draws on fascinating work by Liz Emens,134 which shows that 80-90% of
American women change their surnames when they get married, but trivial numbers of
men do so.135 An obvious potential implication of this data is that a personalized default
132
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rule is appropriate. Changing one’s name is time-consuming,136 but most women will
adopt their husband’s name upon marriage, so the law could just presume that women
adopt their husband’s names, while providing an opt-out for women who wish to retain
their names or hyphenate their last names. Men’s default would be no name change,
again with an option to override that default upon request.
Sunstein contemplates the possibility of using a personalized majoritarian default
for women’s marital name changes, but then rejects the idea, noting that “a default rule of
this kind would be discriminatory, and it would almost certainly be found
unconstitutional.”137 While Emens does not deem unconstitutional a waivable default rule
presuming women wanted to change their names, she does say that compulsory name
changes for women would be unconstitutional,138 and she makes a persuasive feminist
case that state rules increasing the likelihood that women will adopt their husbands’
surnames are normatively undesirable.139 We will explore the descriptive constitutional
claim shortly, but let us address the normative issue first.
We are sympathetic to Emens’s concerns about pressuring women to change
their names in light of the sexist history of name changing conventions. We also share her
concern that adaptive preferences may be causing women to change their names.140 These
strike us as good reasons for the law to continue employing an impersonal default rule
according to which marriage does not entail a surname change.141 Many women will
continue to change their names, overcoming the stickiness of the law’s default term.142
But nearly everything associated with marriage entails undoing a default choice. The
default choice is to remain single. Once one decides to get married, the default choice is
not to serve food at the wedding, to forego flowers, to wear pajamas during the ceremony
(or no clothing at all!), and to send no thank-you notes after receiving gifts. In short,
defaults are not really relevant in these high-stakes settings. The point is simply that if the
state adopts a popular but inegalitarian default, the result may reinforce existing gender
inequality, both because of the power of inertia143 and the expressive dimensions of the
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law.144 We therefore agree with Emens and Sunstein that a crude personalized default,
with gender as the only variable,145 is normatively unattractive.
We think a more compelling case can be made for a granular personalized default
rule. If one examines the name change data on which Emens relied, one sees that there
are various demographic characteristics that substantially affect the probability that a
spouse will adopt her husband’s name upon marriage. A study of female Harvard alumni
showed that 20% of them kept their surnames, whereas a study of the overall population
found only 10% of married women did so, and a more recent study of New York Times
wedding announcements found that 29% of marrying women whose vows were written
up in the paper of record were keeping their surnames.146 Women with advanced degrees,
women who married or became mothers later in life, graduates of elite universities, and
women whose husbands have PhDs were more likely to retain their surnames.147
Daughters of academics were also more likely to retain their surnames.148
Interestingly, demographic variables affecting name changes interact in
somewhat surprising ways. Education levels were highly predictive of whether Caucasian
women would retain their surnames, but going to college had no affect on African
American women’s choices about keeping their surnames, and African American women
generally retain their surnames at significantly higher rates than Caucasian women.149
In light of this substantial variation, how should one feel about a highly granular
personalized default rule? Suppose it turned out that Caucasian women who regularly
shop at Wal-Mart, frequently dine at Cracker Barrel, dropped out of college, and are
marrying spouses with similar characteristics adopt their husband’s surnames 98% of the
time, but that African American women who have Masters Degrees in Education,
subscribe to the Vegetarian Times and Mother Jones, and take yoga classes adopt their
husband’s surnames only 7% of the time. Would it be normatively undesirable for the
state to adopt as a default rule the assumption that Caucasian women with those
characteristics would see their surnames changed upon marriage but these African
American women would not? Imagine the data were to show that 88% of male, vegan,
Prius drivers with PhDs in Philosophy adopt their wives’ surnames upon marriage. Why
not flip the default for these husbands to a name change unless they opted out?
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The red tape associated with a name change is non-trivial,150 and it may be that at
some point the demographic markers of an individual’s preferences with respect to name
changes are sufficiently strong that we need not worry so much about the law’s
expressive effects. Granular personalized default rules that are dependent on mere
stereotypes are undesirable, but granular personalized default rules based on hard data
and sound science may be desirable. Particularly if data miners can drill down and find a
set of men whose names ought to be changed by default, then even the expressive
dimensions of the law may be ambiguous. What’s more, the law’s discomfort with
relying exclusively on problematic classifications like race and gender may become less
pronounced if those factors are mixed with a number of non-suspect classifications to
generate a default rule.151
Even crude, gender-based personalized decision rules may be appropriate when
the dangers of reinforcing an inegalitarian gender norm are minor. Nguyen v. INS is one
of the key precedents governing the law’s use of gender proxies. At issue in Nguyen was
a government policy that imposed greater burdens on those seeking American citizenship
who claim to be the children of United States citizens born out of wedlock. Illegitimate
children of American citizen fathers born out of wedlock could only become citizens if
their fathers legally legitimated them, if their fathers declared their paternity under oath,
or if a court order determined their paternity.152 Maternity was presumed for mothers.
The Supreme Court held that the gender classification was justified by two
factors: first, the government’s interest in assuring that the person claiming citizenship
and the American citizen father are indeed biologically related, and, second, the state
interest in assuring that the person claiming citizenship has a meaningful relationship
with the American citizen parent and, by extension, with the United States.153 The
majority rejected the idea that its decision was based on outmoded gender stereotypes:
There is nothing irrational or improper in the recognition that at the
moment of birth – a critical event in the statutory scheme and in the whole
tradition of citizenship law – the mother’s knowledge of the child and the
fact of parenthood have been established in a way not guaranteed in the
case of the unwed father. This is not a stereotype.154
The Court proceeded to hold that placing additional burdens in the path of the illegitimate
children of U.S. citizen fathers was substantially related to the achievement of important
governmental objectives. The court emphasized that “Congress has not erected inordinate
and unnecessary hurdles to the conferral of the children of citizen fathers in furthering its
important objectives.”155 The burdens placed on an applicant for citizenship and the
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burdens placed on a woman defaulted into a surname change she wishes to avoid are
comparable. The key consideration for the court would be whether accepting a default
rule for surnames that is consistent with most American women’s preferences is “marked
by misconception and prejudice” or shows “disrespect for either class”156 if there is some
reason to believe that the preferences in question are adaptive, and were shaped by a
history of patriarchy.
In light of Nguyen, we do not think it is certain that the implementation of a crude
personalized default rule for surname changes upon marriage would be unconstitutional
as a positive matter; the question strikes us as a close one. We continue to think that such
a rule is undesirable for reasons that feminist legal scholars like Emens have articulated.
Having said that, a nice advantage of granular personalized default rules, as opposed to
crude gender-based distinctions is that it may be easier to achieve doctrinal and popular
consensus around such solutions . . . at least in a world where people do not care much
about information privacy. A classic efficiency versus equity tradeoff thus arises. Crude
personalized default rules, which nicely mitigate the uncertainty problem associated with
personalization, compound the constitutional problems associated with personalization.
We can generalize from Emens’s example of name changes to any legal regime
that incorporates a protected classification like race or gender into a granular personalized
default rule. It is reasonable to survey the history of the state’s race and gender
discrimination and conclude that such classifications ought to rarely be part of the state’s
efforts to generate default rules. Indeed, as Sunstein notes, a major variable in
determining whether the use of personalized default rules is appropriate is the
trustworthiness of the “choice architects” who will frame and determine the contents of
these rules.157 On the other hand, because gender and race can be reliable predictors of
current preferences and future behavior, excluding these variables from an algorithm
entirely leaves a great deal of predictive power on the table. It seems plausible that most
people would prefer an algorithm that knows their race and gender and, as a result, more
accurately predicts their preferences over a system that excludes their race and gender
from consideration, and, as a result provides them with less accurate default rules.
G. Privacy
Information privacy restrictions make it more difficult to generate personalized
default rules.158 Without the ability to track individuals online, access to comprehensive
public and private databases, and various other Big Data strategies, it will be quite
difficult for firms to generate personalized default rules. In the European Union, where
regulators have generally taken a much harder line on data privacy than their American
counterparts,159 such restrictions could well thwart the development of personalized
default rules.
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The privacy literature has long recognized the tradeoffs that information privacy
entails. Scholars have explored the tension between privacy and security,160 privacy and
antidiscrimination,161 privacy and gender equality,162 and privacy and innovation.163 We
can understand the privacy and personalization tradeoff in similar terms. One of the
unanticipated consequences of aggressive data privacy regulations will be a shift towards
impersonal default rules and away from personalized default rules, shifts from granular
personalized default rules to crude personalized default rules, and (as we shall see) shifts
from personalized disclosure to impersonalized disclosure.
The industry attack on “Do Not Track” rules that would govern the collection of
information about consumers’ Internet activities has been largely focused on the benefits
of personalized ads to consumers, as well as their obvious benefits to industry. Making
consumers aware of the potential benefits from personalized defaults and personalized
disclosure may, in the long run, prompt fewer consumers to elect to thwart tracking. After
all, most consumers bring strongly pragmatic perspectives to privacy tradeoffs, and they
are increasingly willing to share information about themselves when the benefits from
sharing are greater and the threats from sharing are diminished.164 There is obviously
another potential wrinkle here as well. The primary debate over Do Not Track has
surrounded the appropriate default rules. Industry groups are open to permitting
individuals to opt out of tracking, but they want to require an affirmative step by
consumers to reject a pro-tracking default rule embedded in web browsers. Many
marketing firms have said they will not honor Do Not Track requests sent by consumers
using Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, which turns on Do Not Track by default.165
Paradoxically, we believe that one way around the current stalemate may be to
use our lack of privacy in order to further privacy interests. If a consumer’s existing
profile reveals that she cares a great deal about her own information privacy, and if her
behavior mirrors that of guinea pigs who chose to protect their own privacy online, then it
should be straightforward to enable Do Not Track by default for that user. Similarly, if a
consumer’s existing profile reveals little concern for privacy and characteristics similar to
those of guinea pigs who decided to enable tracking online, then permitting tracking
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ought to be the appropriate default option. Such use of personalized defaults is appealing
in contexts like online privacy, where defaults appear to be very sticky.166 Note that
although enforcing a Do Not Track rule against firms is costly, enforcing an evidentiary
rule limiting the admissibility of information gleaned from tracking to affect the
personalized default rule that applies to a particular consumer is straightforward. Familiar
problems of adverse selection and unraveling will remain, with bad-credit types and highprivacy-concern types potentially becoming pooled,167 but that is not a problem unique to
personalization. At the margins, the benefits of personalized default rules will prompt
more consumers to surrender private information, a development that is positive in
efficiency terms but problematic to theorists who argue that privacy produces positive
externalities.168
Two more points about privacy are worth underscoring here. First, our proposal is
to use personalized default rules in adjudication. Litigants essentially have no privacy in
the United States. Indeed, the lack of privacy protections in American litigation is a
common source of strenuous complaints from our European counterparts,169 and the
effort to reconcile, say, European data privacy protections with American civil discovery
rules prompts a fair bit of litigation.170 Pushing the point further, it is plausible that
substituting the automated analysis of a litigant’s consumption choices for the possibility
of intrusive questioning of the litigant in depositions and interrogatories may be a privacy
gain, rather than a privacy loss. On the other hand, the greatest impact of our proposal for
personalized default rules in adjudication would be its effect on disputes arising in the
shadow of the law.171 In these settings, the shift towards personalization is almost
certainly associated with diminished privacy. We are skeptical that the American
government will enact meaningful protections for consumer privacy any time soon. To
those who view that reality as a dark cloud, our Article suggests a previously
unrecognized silver lining.
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H. “But I Can Change!”
Before turning to a further extension of personalization, we hope to clarify one
last point about our proposal for personalized default rules. Sunstein notes that the “best
default rules or settings for a particular person, in one year, might be very different from
those in the next year. In principle, the default rules could change on a daily or even
hourly basis.”172 We are skeptical about the underlying assumptions of this objection. We
think that most choices about default rules are driven by personality characteristics and
values, which tend to be rather stable once people reach adulthood. That said, we do
recognize that people sometimes change in ways that might cause them to want
wholesale revisions in their preferences.
We therefore want to underscore that personalization is itself a default rule that
can be waived. Suppose a consumer has a change of heart. She recognizes in the past that
she has been risk-seeking, inattentive, and price insensitive. A divorce, or a bankruptcy,
or a stint in rehab convinces her that she ought to turn over a new leaf. Under our
proposal she need not be stuck with the choices made by her former self. To escape the
consequences of her consumer profile, she may specify that she rejects personalized
defaults. She can specify that she instead wants to contract for the impersonal
majoritarian default rule, or an impersonal minoritarian default rule, or randomized
selection of default rules, or any other set of decision rules to which the counter-party
might agree. Indeed, with the consent of the counterparty, a consumer might specify via
contract that the contract will be governed by the personalized default rules that would
apply to a (presumably admirably rational) third party. “We hereby reject the PoratStrahilevitz proposal for personalized default rules as a basis for interpreting this
contract” would be a valid and enforceable contractual provision, as would “We hereby
agree that the promisee shall be entitled to the personalized default rules that would apply
were this to be a contract between the promisor and Ralph Nader.”
IV.

Personalized Disclosure

The question of default rules has long vexed legal scholars and prompted an
enormous academic literature. In recent years, the topic of disclosures has become
another hotbed of legal scholarship. In particularly noteworthy recent work, Omri BenShahar and Carl Schneider have argued that disclosure to consumers rarely achieves what
its advocates claim, in part because disclosures have a pronounced tendency to grow
longer and more complicated over time.173 Disclosure mandates accumulate in legislation
and regulations, and as a result the disclosures themselves get so lengthy and
cumbersome that consumers stop reading them entirely.
Our “personalized disclosure” solution to the problems that Ben-Shahar and
Schneider identify should be obvious to readers by now, and it is surprising that it is an
approach largely absent from the broader literature on disclosure. We have shown earlier
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how personalization might improve doctor-patient disclosures in the health sector.174 In
this Part we will extend the idea to disclosure more broadly.
Where consumers are purchasing items online, we propose a regime whereby
their Big Data profiles help determine which disclosures they see and which disclosures
they do not see. The advantages of such a regime are apparent. When online disclosures
occur presently, single males who live alone are shown warnings about the effects that
prescription medication may have on pregnant women. Childless seniors living in age
restricted communities are warned about how household goods may have small parts that
can break off and be swallowed by toddlers. Devout, observant Mormons are warned
about the effects of mixing a particular pharmaceutical with alcohol. The proliferation of
warnings targeted towards a small set of potential consumers lengthens disclosures
greatly, heightening the risk that a consumer will fail to see the one or two warnings that
are very pertinent to people just like him. Too much disclosure can be as bad as too little
disclosure, because both result in a consumer retaining too little pertinent information.
We submit that the disclosure strategy can be rescued and rejuvenated by a
personalization strategy that makes the disclosures each consumer sees shorter and more
relevant.
As technology improves, we would anticipate this sort of personalization of
disclosures occurring even in brick and mortar supermarkets, shopping centers, and
hardware stores.175 Twentieth century disclosure technology involved a printed label with
finite space and constraints on how much manufacturers can shrink font sizes to cram
more information into those spaces. Twenty-first century disclosure technology ought to
take advantage of the fact that most consumers now shop with smart-phones that can scan
bar codes.176 Personalized disclosure applications would enable a consumer to scan a
product at the point of sale and to see only the disclosures and warnings likely to be
relevant to him. We believe the health and safety gains from such innovation could be
very substantial.
Similarly, personalized disclosures could replace the various mandatory warnings
that occur whenever an individual rents an apartment or buys a residence. It is not
necessary to warn deaf tenants about a noisy rock band drummer who lives next door. It
is critical to warn noise-sensitive tenants about such drawbacks. Personalizing disclosures
will ensure that the former don’t have their time wasted with irrelevant disclosures and
that the latter don’t fail to notice a key disclosure that is buried amidst a plethora of
irrelevant disclosures.
As best we can tell, this proposal for personalized disclosure is novel. Although
we think our idea is intuitive, we are unaware of any academic literature discussing the
prospects of using Big Data to personalize disclosures. The closest proposal in the
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literature is a recent article by Gil Siegal, Richard Bonnie, and Paul Appelbaum
discussing personalized disclosure in medicine.177 Their version of “personalized
disclosure” differs from ours, and we think it lacks some of the advantages of our
approach. Their first approach to personalized disclosure acts patients at the outset
whether they would like to receive: a) very detailed and precise disclosure of side effects
and medical risks, including information likely to be of interest to only a small subset of
patients; b) moderately detailed and general disclosure of side effects and risks, where
minor and insignificant risks are not disclosed to the patient; and c) very basic disclosures
are made, such as the reasons for the treatment, and the likely period of time the patient
will have to miss work.178 They view the patient’s choice about how much disclosure to
receive as legally significant: “once a patient has stated his preferences and the procedure
has taken place, he may no longer argue in court that the informed consent process was
inadequate in that it failed to provide him with the information he needed.”179
Siegal and his co-authors also identify a second form of personalized disclosure,
one they seem to prefer. Under that approach, disclosure would occur via software that
enabled the patient to click on hyperlinks to find out more about particular risks, side
effects, or tradeoffs.180 The software would record a transcript of what the patient asked
to see and didn’t ask to see, and this transcript would be admissible evidence in any
subsequent litigation over informed consent.
We think Siegal’s proposal is a step in the right direction, but as Big Data
proliferates and the sorts of technologies underlying FICO adherence scoring improves,
we think there is a strong case to be made for preferring our version of personalized
disclosure. Answering many questions about whether one wants to read a particular
paragraph may increase the stress levels of patients, particularly ones who know that by
selecting the minimal disclosure option or failing to click on a particular hyperlink they
will be waiving various legal rights. A regime that scrutinizes the choices that guinea pigs
very similar to the patient have made with the benefit of full information may be a more
sensible way to proceed.181
Indeed, guinea pigs might work differently in the personalized disclosure
context. We would envision guinea pigs being compensated to read various disclosures
and then being asked to evaluate (both immediately and several weeks after the treatment
at issue) how useful the disclosed information proved to be. Non-guinea pig patients
would then be matched up with the choices made by the guinea pigs with personalities
and attributes most similar to them. The key point is that different warnings will be
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differentially helpful to different sorts of people. Personalized disclosure thus locates the
warnings that were useful to “people like you” or “people like those in your household”
and provides you with those warnings, and only those warnings, unless you opt for more
complete disclosure. Parents whose children have peanut allergies will constantly see
peanut-related warnings about products they are considering – including perhaps an “Are
you sure?” message in the checkout line; parents whose own children have no allergies
but who may be bringing in snacks to be shared by a kindergarten class will need to opt
into receiving allergen information when circumstances dictate such additional
precautions. We anticipate that these sorts of personalized disclosures will save
consumers a great deal of time. More importantly, however, they will prompt more
consumers to actually read health and safety disclosures carefully.
We anticipate such personalized disclosures are likely to take root in the arena of
consumer warnings, but they may spread to other domains as well. For example, a smartphone application that knows, based on Big Data and guinea pigs, that I am likely to be
concerned about particular sorts of risks, can also learn that I am concerned by particular
contractual provisions. Most people may not care about the terms of click-wrap software
agreements, but some users may be sensitive about particular rights, responsibilities, and
waivers. Through automation, an app could do what a good lawyer already does – read
the contract in question and advise the client about provisions that may be problematic in
light of the client’s idiosyncrasies. Here again, consumers could benefit from the close
scrutiny that compensated guinea pigs would devote to reading all the pertinent
contractual provisions.
There may be a similar role for personalization to play in the context of
government disclosures. For example, it may make sense for the government to target air
quality warnings directly to asthmatics (and their parents) instead of broadcasting such
warnings through mass media outlets unlikely to pay them much heed. A city government
that knows our daily commute patterns (because we have agreed to share them) can let us
know about accidents along the route while staying silent about accidents on other
highways in the metropolitan area. Under the status quo, consumers and voters can
always “pull” such information out of the public sphere, but doing so entails search costs
and finding the pertinent information can be difficult. Personalized disclosure may often
be the most efficient mechanism for pushing the right information to the right people,
assuming the state can be trusted to put information about individual citizens to
appropriate uses.
Finally, we think there is an important role to play for personalized disclosures in
personalized default rules. Some consumers will respond better than others to the
possibility that they are entering into a contract whose terms are dependent on choices
made by others. Consumers whose profiles suggest they are likely to be upset by this
level of uncertainty might receive additional disclosures about anticipated directions of
those changes and be given easy opportunities to reject such changes. Consumers whose
profiles indicate an interest in saving money wherever they can – even if it means more
onerous contractual terms – might receive regular notices about terms that could be
modified if the customer wishes to realize a cost savings. Other consumers, who rarely
elect to pay less in exchange for fewer contractual rights would receive fewer notices of
this kind. In short there are many ways in which personalized disclosure could address
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some of the complexity problems that arise with personalized contracts. Personalized
disclosures can help consumers determine what their existing profiles indicate about the
meaning of a contract they are contemplating signing, and how their profiles are
influencing the contractual terms. Where similar guinea pigs were not unified over which
terms were best, the consumer may be presented with active choices among several
default terms or instructions as to how the default might be altered.
Whereas the objections to personalizing default rules are many, we think that the
objections to personalized disclosure are fewer in number and less significant. As with
default rules, an individual could always request disclosure of a greater quantum of
information than what personalization suggests, and we would want these choices to be
honored. Given that possibility, it is hard to imagine individuals engaging in strategic
behavior to affect the disclosures that would be made to them, and a personalized
disclosure regime can easily accommodate changes in individuals’ personalities and
preferences. Concerns about cross-subsidies do not arise with respect to personalized
disclosure, nor do uncertainty and fragmentation worries. And constitutional objections to
personalized disclosure by the government seem unlikely – the state regularly makes
judgments about which messages should be conveyed to which audiences, and it seems
hard to believe that even race-based messaging, such as extra warnings to African
Americans about the dangers of sickle cell anemia, are constitutionally problematic. The
potential downsides of personalized disclosure, then, seem confined to misgivings about
stereotyping and privacy. There may also be worries about whether courts are really
willing to countenance the possibility that someone might not receive a warning about an
extremely low-probability side effect based on their personality profile, and then, due to
some fluke, the low-probability side effect should manifest itself.182 In such
circumstances, courts should not award compensation. Social insurance, rather than the
tort system, is the best mechanism for compensating victims, given the inability of
would-be defendants to fully capture the benefits of non-disclosure resulting from
personalization.
To summarize, we think that personalized disclosures may be the wave of the
future too. They have the potential to minimize the information overload problem faced
by consumers and to prompt consumers to start paying attention to pertinent disclosed
information once again. And they even have the potential to alter, for the better, the way
that contracting is done.

V. Conclusion
The idea of personalized default rules has been “in the air” for several decades.
Although the origins of our inquiry can be found in Ian Ayres’s essay, published twenty
years ago, no one has developed a comprehensive account of personalized default rules.
Cass Sunstein took the idea an important step further, and pointed out some of the main
benefits and drawbacks of a personalized default rule regime, compared with impersonal
defaults and active choices. Our Article has finally developed a comprehensive
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framework for understanding the theoretical and practical issues arising in the
implementation of personalized default rules.
Along the way, we have contributed several innovations. For example, we have
shown how providing a limited number of guinea pigs with resources to make rational
decisions, and using particular guinea pigs’ choices to generate the default rules that will
be presented to the most similar members of the general public makes personalization
substantially more attractive. We have explained how majoritarian and minoritariandefault rules might be made more effective through personalization. And we have broken
down the category of personalized default rules into crude personalized defaults (which
are applied with more certainty by adjudicators, less precise, more impervious to strategic
behavior) and granular personalized defaults (which have the opposite costs and
benefits). Perhaps most interestingly, we have shown that personalization may present an
important way forward, not only for default rules, but also for various disclosures to
consumers and the citizenry. As we demonstrate, the most powerful critiques that have
been launched against disclosure are largely products of disclosure’s impersonal nature.
The disclosure strategy can be resuscitated via personalization.
Why has it taken the literature so long to reach this juncture? We believe the
answer is that until recently technological constraints would have rendered our approach
wildly unrealistic. But the Big Data revolution fundamentally changed the equation, at
least in the United States. Now more than ever, implementing a personalized default rule
regime is attainable, and personalized disclosures are within reach, given minor
improvements in the social science research and applicable technology. We call on
legislatures and courts to respond to the challenge proposed in this Article, by
considering personalized default rules for consumer contracts, contracts between repeatplayers, inheritance law, medical malpractice, and landlord-tenant law.
Legislatures should consider tailoring personalized default rules, at least in those
areas when it is quite obvious that the law’s goals could better be achieved with
personalized default rules, and where implementing them is feasible and not too costly.
Thus, in inheritance law, intestacy rules should be personalized in accordance with
existing data, provided a bit more research is first done into whether the preferences and
characteristics of intestates differ from those of testators of the same gender. Courts
hearing medical malpractice suits should allow doctors to raise the argument that they
adopted a disclosure practice that is consistent with the personal characteristics of their
patients, as revealed by FICO adherence scores and other data-driven patient profiling
technologies. Courts should also avoid using constitutional provisions developed before
personalization could be contemplated to suffocate personalized rules in the crib.
Regulators should fund pilot projects to facilitate personalized disclosure, and legislators
might create safe harbor provisions to encourage manufacturers, retailers, and service
providers to begin innovating with personalized disclosures in the private sector.
We realize that personalizing default rules and disclosure is costly. There is a
tradeoff here, somewhat similar to the rules versus standards tradeoff, between certainty
and accuracy: more personally detailed default rules could increase accuracy but at the
same time create uncertainty for courts applying default rules to disputes and private
actors trying to anticipate what courts might do. Because the tradeoffs are significant, we
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advocate beginning with personalized default rules in the easiest cases, followed by
incremental advances if early results are promising.
Personalized default rules and personalized disclosure are just two pieces, albeit
important ones, of a more ambitious idea, which is personalized law in general. One
could imagine a legal system where criminal law, constitutional law, tort law, and
property law are personally tailored to people’s preferences and characteristics. Indeed,
aspects of these bodies of law are already crudely personalized to some degree. Consider
insanity defenses or the Sentencing Guidelines in criminal law, litigant-sensitivity in First
Amendment law,183 the debate over tort law’s eggshell skull doctrine,184 and takings
doctrine’s focus on a landowner’s “distinct, investment-backed expectations.” We might
anticipate far more granular and data-driven personalization in each of these domains
during the coming years. Envisioning such a legal system is beyond our present project.
Nevertheless, we believe the case for trying personalized default rules and personalized
disclosure in various contexts is sufficiently compelling to warrant near-term
experimentation.
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